This work is the prolegomena to my study of Abhinavagupta and Non-dual \textit{(Advaya)} Kashmir Śaivism. In this work, I will be introducing and discussing four themes of AKS studies: history, cosmology, perception, and ritual. The first chapter deals with the historical identity of AKS through a discussion of its roots and one of its primary proponents, the founder of the Trika school, Abhinavagupta. The second chapter discusses identity from a metaphysical and cosmological point of view. This chapter looks at the event of self-identification as synonymous with the event of liberation; that is, the identity that is sought is identity of oneself qua \textit{Bhairava}. The third chapter, a brief treatise on perception, acts as the conjunctive factor in the relation of participation and identity. Finally, the fourth Chapter consists of what a number of scholars have said about ritual practice in Śaivism, and specifically what the Trika gurus have said, specifically Abhinava’s views on ritual (\textit{Kriyā}).
INDEX WORDS: Abhinavagupta, Śaivism, Ritual, Perception, Phenomenology, Bhaṭṭhari, Language Theory, Darśana
PROLEGOMENA TO MY STUDY OF ABHINAVAGUPTA AND ADVAYA
KASHMIR ŚAIVISM
BOOK 1: IDENTITY AND PARTICIPATION
(ABHIMĀNA AND SĀDHANĀ)

by

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PROLEGOMENA TO MY STUDY OF ABHINAVAGUPTA AND ADVAYA

KASHMIR ŚAIVISM

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(ABHIMĀNA AND SĀDHANĀ)

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INTRODUCTION

This work is the prolegomena to my study of Abhinavagupta\(^1\) and Non-dual (Advaya) Kashmir Šaivism.\(^2\) In this work, I will be introducing and discussing four themes of AKS studies: history, cosmology, perception, and ritual. I have chosen these themes because I want this Thesis to work at an introductory level, as well as addressing the idea of participation and identity. Under the heading of identity there are two chapters: one on history, and one on cosmology. The first chapter deals with the historical identity of AKS through a discussion of its roots and one of its primary proponents, the founder of the Trika school, Abhinavagupta. The second chapter discusses identity from a metaphysical and cosmological point of view.\(^3\) This chapter looks at the event of self-identification as synonymous with the event of liberation; that is, the identity that is sought is identity of oneself qua Bhairava.\(^4\) Here we will examine what Bhairava is, and what is man's relation to this ultimate reality. In order to do this we will look at the cosmological schematism that is a key component of AKS philosophical theory (jñāna) and ritual practice (kriyāsādhanā).

The third chapter, a brief treatise on perception, acts as the conjunctive factor in the relation of participation and identity. The first section is an account of the various ways that perception has been discussed throughout India’s history. The second section

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\(^1\) While the work does not deal with Abhinavagupta, or the Trika system, exclusively, I have nonetheless leaned heavily on his work as a guide.

\(^2\) For the remainder of the paper I will use AKS to refer to the Advaya Kashmir Šaiva system.

\(^3\) At this point I am still uncertain as to whether or not we should understand this metaphysical, or cosmological explanation to necessarily contain an ontological position in the strictest sense of ontology.

\(^4\) Bhairava is the term used by Abhinava to denote the ultimate (Anuttara). The Anuttara is, essentially, self-illuminating consciousness (caittanya).
deals specifically with AKS theories of perception. My claim is that perception functions as the mirror that allows one to see oneself as identical with Bhairava if we pay attention to what arises in the mirror, and this "what" which arises. Whether identity is the result, or, rather the effect, of an epistemological or ontological alteration in the practitioner remains to be seen. Whichever is the case, the process of perception and the role of perception cannot be underrated as keys to understanding the connections between participation and liberation, and what it means to be liberated (identified with Bhairava). It seems, at least at some level, that participation is a necessary component in order for one to be identified with Bhairava. The various ways that a practitioner participates are numerous. So, for the last chapter, I have included what a number of scholars have said about ritual practice in Śaivism, and specifically what AKS gurus have said, specifically Abhinava’s views on ritual (Kriyā).

My paper has been aided by the series of texts written about Non-dual (Advaya) Kashmir Śaivism, which have been published over the past few decades. I have used works by scholars such as: Paul Muller Ortega, Swami Laksman-joo, Jaideva Singh, Bettima Baumer, Lilian Silburn, and Mark Dyczkowski. Besides being top-rate scholars, one thing almost all of them have in common is that they have actually studied, and practiced, with AKS gurus. I find this fascinating because many of the texts written by AKS masters were intended to be read by practitioners, and were generally intended to be read and studied with the help of a teacher. For instance, Abhinava writes at the beginning of the Pāratrīśkā-Vivaraṇa:

For the clear understanding of my pupils and for refreshing the memory of those who are already proficient in this śāstra (this philosophical
discipline) I, Abhinavagupta, am making a little exertion (in writing this commentary).\(^5\)

I fail to fit these criteria, and it is for this reason that I feel my work is somewhat irresponsible.

Throughout my work, I ask, and leave unanswered, many questions. This is not the result of laziness; rather, I clearly have not had the time, nor the space, to fully examine all points as closely as I would like to have done. However, I do not see this work as completed. I intend, and invite all those interested, to continue probing into the problems and areas of interest raised in this work. Personally, I intend to approach this work differently in the future and other readers that take the suggestions of AKS masters might chose to do so also.

It seems that the following points may need to be considered in order to achieve the richest possible understanding of the Trika system of AKS. The necessity of practice cannot be denied. For example, as the above quote makes clear, many of these works are written for people that have already had certain experiences and spent quite some time studying. Again, Abhinava writes:

I have briefly concluded it according to (the teaching of) my guru and the Ágama. As to what happens by resorting to this I-consciousness, ask your personal experience. I have only shown a little bit of the path. One should not rest with this much…\(^6\)

Not only does this remind us that practice is important, it also makes clear that teachers are needed. After all, this is how Abhinava learned, and undoubtedly how he believes all should. I have devoted an entire section to the discussion of Tantric practices (one of


\(^6\) Bäumer, Parātrīśkā, xix.
which is the role of the guru). Please refer to this in order to understand just how important the teacher is.

What I believe is needed for a responsible reading does not exclude scrutiny and critique as long as it is warranted. In fact, I believe this is exactly the type of approach that should be welcomed. I have tried to begin this type of approach in my work; however, I have only generally recognized problems or points of concern, and rarely have I been able to provide an adequate explanation.
CHAPTER 1

MAPPING THE TERRITORY: HISTORY AND LINEAGE

This first chapter consists of a number of topics that will prove useful in understanding AKS broadly, and the Trika specifically. I have tried to present these topics in an orderly fashion so that each section will illuminate troublesome areas in the sections that follow it. This chapter should be read prior to chapters two through four and will prove helpful to refer back to as one reads the text.

Tantra

History

Now, we will briefly reflect on the history of Tantra. I have decided to make some remarks regarding the history and development of Tantric thought because of the Tantric nature of AKS. There have been many attempts to determine the influence of Tantra upon Śaivism, or Śaivism upon Tantra, usually for the sake of arguing that one allowed the other to come to fruition. This search is problematic because of the similarities between the two, even from their earliest recorded dates. In the interest of precision and factuality, I will stick with what is known and commonly accepted. For reasons of scholarly consensus, I have chosen the well-known and equally well respected works of Agehananda Bharati, and N.N. Bhattacharyya. This is not to say that these works are without flaw; however, the extent their of research is unmatched.

What we know is that the pre-Aryan Harappan civilization possessed seals
imprinted with "a big-nosed gentleman wearing a horned head-dress who sits in the lotus position with an erect penis, an air of abstraction and an audience of animals." It is possible that this is an early representation of Siva in his Pasupati embodiment. There are certainly oppositions to this claim such as the common theory that this figure most likely represents the emphasis placed on the powers of fertility by the Harappan people. In contrast to, and in connection with, this early ithyphallic figure is a naked 'dancing girl' figurine, as well as numerous yoni and linga statues. Bhattacharya takes these finds to be evidence that "the beginning of the Tantric cult of Śrīcakra, which is nothing but the representation of the female generative organ, can thus be historically traced to the ruins of the Harappan culture." I, however, am not sure that tracing the roots of Tantra and its historical beginnings are that simple. What these Harappan finds do indicate is that even from the earliest historical periods in India, there was an emphasis placed upon the body, particularly its generative organs and functions, as Tantra is known to do.

Bhattacharya recounts that early Tantra essentially consisted of "the sum total of man's knowledge of the objective world around him... a

---

8 Pāśupati roughly translates as "lord of animals." It should be noted that there are many who oppose the theory that this figure can be directly linked with early Śiva worship. References to Śiva as Pāśupati are continued to this day, especially in the Śaiva-Siddhānta sects of South India. The idea of Pāśupati has also taken on a metaphysical meaning. For more see Richard H. Davis, *Ritual in an Oscillating Universe: Worshipping Śiva in Medieval India* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993).  
9 N.N. Bhattacharyya, *History of the Tantric Religion*. 2nd ed. (Delhi, India: Manohar, 1999), 130. The Yoni is representative of the Vagina; the Liṅga, of the penis.  
10 Ibid., 130.  
11 I hesitate to refer to Tantra as a system because it seems more like a trend that can be found within a variety of systems whenever emphasis is placed upon the body and spiritual practices become localized within the body, whether this 'bodily practice' is symbolic or actual. Following Bhattacharyya, *Tantric Religion*, 19-20, I have, however, opted to refer to the 'Tantric system' in order to delineate between the early use of Tantra as "the sum total of man's knowledge of the objective world around him... a way of life that sought the significance of knowledge not in realisation of an illusory absolute, but in day to day activities (agriculture etc.) experimental sciences like alchemy, medicine physiology... with a deliberate orientation that the structures of the microcosm and the macrocosm are identical and that the key to the knowledge of nature is to be found in the body," and the broad movement, which affected Hindu and Buddhist systems alike, that was in full swing after the fifth century ce. The summary I make at the end of this section is indicative of the post fifth century ce "Tantric movement."
way of life that sought the significance of knowledge not in realisation of an illusory absolute, but in day to day activities (agriculture etc.) experimential sciences like alchemy, medicine physiology... with a deliberate orientation that the structures of the microcosm and the macrocosm are identical and that the key to the knowledge of nature is to be found in the body."

From this definition it easy to understand why early materials referred to as Tantras were generally scientific or alchemical works. The term Tantra, as recounted by the *Mīmāṃsakas*, was used to refer to act-processes: methods of doing or making things. So it seems that Tantra, at least in its earliest form, was pragmatically oriented, and had little to do with what is now commonly referred to as religion. Early Tantric literature did not tend to be religious in nature. Over time this began to change.

In its first use as a religious item, Tantra denoted "the scripture by which knowledge is spread." Eventually Tantra came to be seen as a class of texts "which promulgates profound matters concerning *tattva* (theory, later pure knowledge) and *mantra* (practical means, later mystic sounds)." Even though there seems to be a shift in Tantra from a pragmatic "this-worldly" approach to a more abstract "spiritual" approach, the major focus is still based upon happenings in this life; not some ‘other’ world. An example of a spiritual "this-worldly" approach is the notion, held by many Tantric sects, of embodied liberation (*Jīvanmukti*). Bharti remarks that "Hindu Tantrism and Buddhist Tantrism take their entire speculative apparatus from non-tantric absolutist Hindu and

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13 Ibid. , 19.
14 For more on this discussion of the inadequacies of the terms Religion and Philosophy, see section3.1.
15 Ibid. , 25. Bhattacarya states that it is possible that early Tantrics denied the existence of a soul and were perhaps closely associated with the materialist Lokāyattas. However, the accounts of this are generally recounted by Vedic Brahmins and one cannot help but wonder if this is not a political ploy, not uncommon, to gather of ones opponents into one category and attack them wholesale. What the Lokāyatta, Tantra and Sāmkhya all had in common, and are generally challenged for is their recognition and acceptance of a material world.
16 Ibid. , 20.
17 Ibid. , 20.
Buddhist thought [Vedānta and Yogācāra, respectively]...Common to both is their fundamental absolutism: their emphasis on a psycho-experimental rather than a speculative approach; and their claim that they provide a shortcut to redemption... There is really no Tantric philosophy apart from Hindu or Buddhist philosophy, or, to be more specific, from Vedāntic and Mahāyāna thought."¹⁸ This will be an interesting point to keep in mind as we further progress and begin to recognize many similarities shared between AKS and Buddhist, as well as Vedāntin thought.

**Practices & Theory**

While Vedic Brahmins sought to paint *Tantrikas*¹⁹ as low-caste and defiled,²⁰ there were still attempts to situate the Tantras originating from the Vedas. This was likely a political move.²¹ It is important to understand that being outside the realm of the Vedas (*vedabāhya*) was not an issue for the Tantras. They did not feel the need to be associated with Vedic Brahmanism nearly as much as Vedic Brahmins sought to bring the *Tantras*, their literature and practices, within the realm of Vedic authority. In fact, many *Tantrikas*, such as the *Kāpālikas*, often sought to act in manners contrary to orthodox norms. The importance of these practices, commonly referred to as *Vamā* (left-handed), when actually practiced, and *daksīna*, when only symbolically carried out, included: eating meat, drinking alcohol, sexual orgies, interaction with dead bodies and having sex with low caste women. These practices are what are generally referred to as Tantric, though they are only a portion of the large corpus of Tantric practice.

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¹⁸ Agehananda Bharti, *The Tantric Tradition*. 3rd ed. (New York, N.Y.: Samuel Weiser, 1975), 31. In conversation Glenn Wallis has reminded me that there are also Tantric elements to be found in Theravada Buddhism.

¹⁹ *Tantrika*: Tantric practitioner


There are at least two viable explanations for these rather odd sounding acts. Firstly, it may be that these acts were carried out by those living in areas that were considered to be dangerous and outside of Vedic Brahmanism, such as the forest and jungle areas. If this was the case, then these practices would only be considered immoral when compared to the Vedic norms. Those that practiced the \textit{vamā} method within the space of civilized Vedic territory may have done so simply to indicate their dissatisfaction with the Brahmin ruling caste and their disillusionment with the \textit{varṇāśramadharma} in general. In fact, it was not uncommon to make new practitioners outwardly denounce their reliance upon Vedic authority. This seems like a likely motivation considering the outright rejection of the \textit{varṇāśramadharma} by most Tantric practitioners. Secondly, these anti-Vedic, seemingly insane and disturbing practices, were carried out in order to help the practitioner realize and dissolve the tendency to polarize; whether the polarization be of good/bad, right/wrong, spiritual/physical, etc. This is the most likely response from practitioners.

While Bhattacaryya’s work is indispensable for a historical account of Tantra, Agehananda Bharti provides an excellent systematization of various elements found in almost all Tantric systems. His list is so indicative of what medieval Indian Tantric systems were composed of one could almost use it as a template to judge the "tantra-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} It seems that many pre-aryan peoples, referred to as either Dravidians or more pejoratively as \textit{mlecchas}, were prone to practice something that basically followed the outline of the Harappans; usually emphasizing the role of the mother-goddess.
\item \textsuperscript{23} \textit{Varṇāśramadharma}: The theory that there is an order to society that is delineated by four castes (\textit{varṇa-s}, which are indicative of birthright, and four stages of life (\textit{aśrama-s}) which all twice borns (members of the first three castes) must participate in. Additionally, keeping with a rejection of Vedic norms, Tantra almost categorically accepts the equality of men and women. In many Tantric sects it is common practice that women become \textit{guru-s}.
\item \textsuperscript{24} I say were, but the fact is that these practices are still carried out to this day.
\item \textsuperscript{25} This is how Abhinava will respond to the question of “Why?”.
\end{itemize}
ness" of a system. The strength of Bharti’s work lies in his focus on two particularly important elements for our study: initiation and mantra.

According to Bharti, "mantra is not synonymous with Kavaca (protective formula), yāmala (a mantra based on a text) or dhārani (a mnemonic formula which contains mantras)."²⁶ He writes:

...mantra is meaningful not in any descriptive or even persuasive sense, but within the mystical universe of discourse; that is, it constitutes a particular phase of literary expression belonging to discourse. Mantra is verifiable not by what it describes but by what it effects: if it creates that somewhat complex feeling-tone in the practicing person, which has found its expression in the bulk of mystical literature such as Tantra, then it is verified; or in other words, the principle of verification of mantra lies in its emotive numinous effect as well as in the corroboration of such effects in religious literature.²⁷

Mantra comes from the root -man (to think) and is combined with –tra, which is "the krt-suffix indicating instrumentality."²⁸ The elements of this term indicate that it is understood to be efficacious in some manner.²⁹ Mantras were not open to the public; the impartation of a mantra by one's guru was an essential part of the initiation ritual. Bharti claims that it is the giving of a mantra, by the guru, to the disciple, that differentiates

²⁶ Bharti, Tradition, 102.
²⁷ Ibid., 103.
²⁸ Ibid., 103.
²⁹ This is interesting because speech is often referred to as parāvāk (ultimate speech; transcendent languaging) which is the unmanifest thought and experience of Paramaśiva that becomes manifest as speech when the conditions are right. J.C. Chatterji, Kashmir Shaivism (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1986), 130. In order to understand this one should remember that the Trika system is similar to Śāktaśāṅkya in that they propose an evolution into more manifested forms. Further examination of this may reveal close connections with Bhartṛhari, the sixth century Indian Grammanrian, famous for his idea of śabdabrahman. Also, as early as the revelation of the Śiva Sūtras there are references to language as the mātrkā; it being a fetter as well as a practice to unbind the fetters. Additionally, each Tattva has a parallel phoneme from the Sanskrit alphabet. Mantra in particular, and speech sounds in general are central to Abhinava's philosophy. In fact, a whole manual, (Bäumer, Parātrīśikā) was written explaining the various mystical values of the phonemes of the Sanskrit alphabet, and how one can use them in order to attain Jīvan-mukti.
initiation (dīkṣa) from consecration of the initiate (abhiṣeka).\textsuperscript{30} The content of a dīkṣa must, without exception, be a mantra of some sort.\textsuperscript{31}

A summary of a few points to be kept in mind regarding Tantra:

-Tantra maintains the maxim "That which is not in the body is not in the universe,"\textsuperscript{32} therefore, there will be an emphasis placed upon the use of the body in the pursuit of spiritual goals- be they siddhi or mukti.

-Tantric tainted systems tend to prescribe practices that are Vedabāhya: sexual intercourse with low caste women, allowing women to participate in ritual practices, drinking wine, eating meat, and meditating in cemeteries are later extreme Tantric ideas that are good examples of the minimal amount of adherence to Vedic ideals.

\textbf{Sāṃkhya}

Related to both Tantra and Trika is Sāṃkhya. Though Sāṃkhya is currently considered a Vedic system, this has not always been the case. In fact, in its early years it was considered to be vedabāhya, perhaps intimating closer connections with early Tantra than is commonly recognized. The connections with Tantra go all the way back to the fertility cults of the Harappan civilization; specifically their dichotomizing of the male and female principles into two ontologically distinct categories: puruṣa and prakṛti, respectively. This is an ontology that a number of scholars argue is synonymous with Sāṃkhya. I am a little reluctant to accept this theory \textit{in toto}, but what cannot be disputed are the similarities between the two basic principles of the universe that these groups (the Harappans and the Sāṃkhya) propose: puruṣa and prakṛti. In line with the problem of determining the origins of Śaivism, the problem of determining the exact nature of the elements of Tantric ontology arise with an inability to determine if Sāṃkhya was a

\textsuperscript{30} Bharti, \textit{Tradition}, 186.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 186.
\textsuperscript{32} Bhattacharyya, \textit{Tantric Religion}, ??.
Tantric offshoot that tweaked their puruṣa/prakṛti principles or developed more or less independently of Tantric influence and Tantra, only later, imported the puruṣa/prakṛti model. This is a question that may not be answerable—just how influential Tantra was in Śāṅkhya's origin. Another, interesting point is the possible duality signified by the generative organs, liṅga and Yoni, which may have been objects of worship for the Harappans. Whether they were indicative of an ontological position remains to be seen.

Śāṅkhya shares certain similarities with the AKS also. In fact, the first through the twenty-fifth tattva-s are exactly the same as those found in Śāṅkhya ontology, though there are subtle differences; namely that in the Trika system, as in the whole of Advaya Kashmir Śaivism, there are ten additional tattva-s, as well as the Ultimate (anuttara), generally denoted as Paramaśiva or Bhairava. While Puruṣa is an inactive principle of subjectivity in Śāṅkhya, in Trika the Puruṣa is the anu, the non-spatial point, which is an individuated manifestation resulting from the kañchukas. It is permeated with, as well as a coagulation of, consciousness (caitanya). Prakṛti is understood differently also, its role in Śāṅkhya being fulfilled by the māyā tattva in AKS. These ideas will be discussed later.

Śaiva Scripture and Other Background Material

Other Srotas of Scripture

The Tantric Śaiva sects consider the 28 "siddhāntāgamas" as their main body of literature; another 200 or so works of Śaiva scripture (called the upāgamas) complete the
basic Tantric Śaiva canon. These works, which were "primarily concerned with ritual and devote relatively little space to philosophical matters or even yoga," were essentially concerned with Sadāśiva, generally placing emphasis upon the linga during worship.

Esteemed as revealed scripture, the siddhāntāgamas had a characteristically Indian way of being added to for centuries. These āgamas, usually dualistic in nature, were soon interpreted as revealing a philosophical system in which there are three basic realities: Siva (pati), the fettered soul (paśu) and the factors that bind it (pāśa). This system, generally, though perhaps misleadingly, referred to as śaivasiddhānta, still flourishes in Southern India.

While accepting the sacredness of the Tantric Śaiva "canon" en masse, different Tantric lineages emphasized the importance of particular āgamas over others. It was believed that of the five faces of Sadāśiva each one was responsible for speaking a specific current (srota) of thought. For instance, the Siddhāntāgamas were spoken by the upper face of Sadāśiva. Of particular interest for our study are the Bhairavatantras.

The Bhairavatanras

The Bhairavatantras are, in a word, frightening. "Bhairava, whose name literally means 'the terrible one', is the 'wrathful', 'frightening' form of Siva who is 'peaceful' and 'auspicious'." It is Bhairava, sometimes called Mahākālabhairava, whom Abhinava

34 Ibid., 4.
35 Ibid., 5. See section 1.1.a on Tantra and Paśupati of the Harappan people.
36 Ibid., 6.
37 Ibid., 7. Dyczkowski provides an etymology, written by Abhinava, of Bhairava. It reads:

1) Bhairva is he who bears all things and is supported by the universe, filling it and sustaining it on the one hand, while uttering it or conceiving it on the other.
2) Bhairava is he who protects those frightened by the rounds of rebirth.
devotes a plethora of his work to.\textsuperscript{38} Bhairava, understood "as the divine form of the absolute realized as the exertive force (udyama) that drives the senses and mind at the microcosmic level along with the universe at the macrocosmic level," is often associated with the practice of eating meat, drinking wine, ritual intercourse and yogic practices performed in the cremation grounds.\textsuperscript{39} All of these practices are reminiscent of the Kāpālikas, a possible sub-sect of what may be the earliest Siva sect- the Paśupatas.

**The Paśupatas: Kāpālikas & Kālāmukhas**

Little is known about the Paśupatas except that they practiced an extreme form of ascetism in order to achieve union with Śiva, or, as they called it Rudrasāyujya.\textsuperscript{40} Apparently, the Paśupatas would intentionally irritate people in order to be abused as a way to purge themselves of sin and gain merit.\textsuperscript{41} Two related sects- the Kāpālikas and the Kālāmukhas- are better documented; though the reliability of the facts remains questionable due to the fact that our sources are generally the works of Vedic Brahmins who tended to see Tantric practices as lowly and despicable. The Kālāmukhas are not very important for our study but the Kāpālikans definitely have a space in AKS history.

3) Bhairava is the one born in the heart of those who, terrified by transmigratory existence, call on him for help.
4) Bhairava is he who arouses by His grace a fear of transmigration.
5) Bhairava is he whose light shines in the minds of those yogis who are intent on assimilating time (kālagrāsa) into the eternal presence of consciousness and thus exhaust the energy of time said to be the driving force behind the machine of the galaxies.
6) Bhairava is the lord of the powers of the senses whose shouting (rāvaṇa) frightens the souls in bondage.
7) Bhairava is the lord who calls a halt to the transmigration and thus is very terrible.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. , 7. Mahākālabhairava is considered the protector of three cities; Ujjain, Benares and Kathmandu. Interestingly, Mahākāla, a Buddhist god, functions as the protector of Lhasa.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. , 8. These practices are similar to those of the Kāpālika and are indicators of the Krama-kula oriented nature of both the Bhairava worshippers, as well as worshippers of kālī.
\textsuperscript{40} Paul Eduardo Muller-Ortega, The Triadic Heart of Śiva: Kaula Tantricism of Abhinavagupta in the Non-Dual Shaivism of Kashmir (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1989) , 32. This is perhaps reminiscent of the antiquity of the Paśupatas because Rudra was the Vedic form of Śiva, and if they are to be the oldest Śiva worshippers it makes sense they would worship an early form. But the question arises, do they see themselves as Śaivites, or only the later sects that incorporate Rudra into Śiva’s list of manifestations?
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. , 32.
Kāpālika practitioners were, and still are, known for their bizarre behavior that often included drinking from a skull and meditating in cemeteries. Additionally, the Kāpālikān may cover himself in ashes, specifically the ashes of a corpse. The Kāpālikas were known to have close connections with the Nātha-siddhas as well.

Nātha to Kula

As far as origins are concerned, it remains to be seen exactly what the connections are between Tantra and Śaivism. There are certainly Tantric elements found in the many forms of Śaiva practice from the various Śaiva sects. It seems likely that, broadly defined, Śaivism, and, broadly defined, Tantra were interacting and influencing each other for many centuries. As far as Kashmir Śaivism is concerned, many of its roots can be traced to the Nātha-siddhas, and the Kula lineage. The Kula lineage is itself a broad category that can be found existing in many different systems, much like Tantra. We will first discuss the origins of the Nātha-siddhas, precursors to the Kaulas, and then explore the kula system in depth.

I will relate the whole of the Nātha origin myth as found in Bhattacharya’s History of Tantric Religions.

According to the Nātha cosmology, before creation everything was dark and void. In that vacuity came into being a bubble from which an egg was formed. The yellow portion of the egg was the Earth and the white portion the sky. From the sweat of the primal god, Ādinātha, was born his lover Ketakī or Manasā, and from their union sprung Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. In order to test them Ādinātha assumed the form of a mutilated corpse. Having seen the corpse Brahmā and Viṣṇu avoided it, but Śiva recognized it as the body of his father and took it to the cremation ground. When the body was in flames, Mīnanātha sprang from its navel, Goraksa from its head, Hādi-pa from its bones, Kānu-pa from its ear, and Caurangi from its legs. They are the five original Nātha Siddhas. Because Śiva was the most competent son of Ādinātha, the latter was married to Ketakī who
came to be known as Gaurī or Candī. Śiva possessed mahājñāna, the knowledge which could make a man immortal. Siva determined to impart this knowledge to Gaurī and took her to the middle of a sea to do so. Mīnanātha guessed Śiva's intention. Assuming the form of a fish he was able to learn this knowledge. When Śiva came to know this he cursed Mīnanātha that he would forget the knowledge. Meanwhile, Gaurī desired to make the five siddhas worldly-minded. She used her erotic tricks so that they might be attracted to women. Except for Goraksanātha, the passions of other four Siddhas were aroused by her gestures, as a result of which Mīnanātha was snared to become the ruler of women in a country called Kadalīdesa, Hādi-pa to become the stable sweep of queen Mainamatī, Kānu-pa was banished into Dahukā country, and Caurangī cohabitated with his stepmother. Goraksa, however, was married to a princess and had a son by her known as Karpatinātha.42

Goraksanātha, the reputed founder of the Nāthas and reportedly a fisherman by birth,43 is believed to be the author of many Hatha yoga texts. Anyone familiar with Hatha yoga is probably aware of the extent the body plays in these practices, so it is no wonder that the general practice of the Nātha-siddhas was "Kāya-sādhana or the culture of the body with the view to making it perfect and immutable and thereby attaining immortal spiritual life. To escape death... was the central point round which grew the details of the siddha cult."44 This practice could lead to at least two possible outcomes: 1) embodied liberation (jīvan-mukti), and 2) highest liberation (parā-mukti), "in which the liberated one is 'immortalized' in a perfect body that, in some respects, makes him an embodied Śiva."45

The process to escape death involves regressive sādhanā (ulṭā-sādhanā) in which the sādhaka attempts to repress and redirect sexual energy.46 The particular practices of the Nātha, especially the ulṭā-sādhanā, form the core of many subsequent teachings. This

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42 Bhattarcaryya, Tantric Religion, 266- 267.  
43 Ibid. , 267.  
44 Muller-Ortega, Heart, 36.  
46 Ibid. , 37. It is interesting to note that the Nātha siddha-s were celibate.
practice is, without a doubt, one of the identifying features of the Nātha-s and the various Śaiva sects such as the Kāpālikas and the Kaula.

Kaula

Kula, Akula & Kaula

The term parām Kaulam denotes the union of two principles: akula, the male principle, the authentic being, and kula, the female principle, which is the emission (visarga) of akula. In a sense, kula, Śakti, is the dynamic power of akula, Śiva. In this union it is not the case that akula and kula are two separate 'entities,' nor are they one entity; rather it seems that they are not-two, and at the same time not-one-- they are non-dual (advaya). Kaula is intolerant to any practice that indicates or reinforces a duality. This is the Supreme Kaula; that "which is both at rest in itself (shānta) as well as rising out of itself (udita) in the form of cosmic manifestation."47

This reality can be realized through certain practices such as: eating meat, drinking wine, meditating in cemeteries and ritual intercourse, all of which seem to fit within the Tantric realm of practice. While there does seem to be something like a corpus of literature we can call the kaulatantra, elements of Kaula practice litter many Indian systems, specifically those with an affinity to Śiva; even more so those that hold Bhairava as the supreme.49 Dyczkowski reminds us that "kula doctrine originates in these two currents of scripture [Vāma and Daksiṇasrotas] and so is said to flow from

48 Ibid. , 83. It should be noted that Matsyendranātha is considered to be the first Kaula teacher of this age.
49 Dyczkowski, Canon, 59.
them and extend them at their farthest limits."\textsuperscript{50} Kaula, with its practice of arousing \textit{kundalini} energies and its insistence upon the significance of Śakti worship, is assignable to a certain identifiable system as well as a trend of various Tantras."\textsuperscript{51} Another important aspect of \textit{Kula}, as well as \textit{akula}, worship is the theory of universal emission and re-absorption.\textsuperscript{52} This theory, referred to as \textit{Spanda}, is central to AKS.

\textit{Kaula} traditions tended to be extremely secretive; so secretive, in fact, that oral transmission was often the only manner in which one could receive the teachings.\textsuperscript{53} Again, this is another element that is tantric in nature; the insistence upon initiation by a guru that imparts the teachings. That the teachings are spoken indicates the importance of speech. In the illustration of the five faces of Śadasiva, from which the five \textit{srotas}\textsuperscript{54} flow, that of the \textit{kula} is located in the nether regions. According to the \textit{Kaula} tradition, it is the lower mouth, hidden beneath the other five, which rises up and permeates them all, leading to the bliss of \textit{paraśiva}. Again this notion of arising and permeating is indicative of the valued notions of emission and absorption of the \textit{Kundalini}.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 61.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 60.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} We see these elements in \textit{Vaiṣṇava} tantras, such as \textit{Pāñcarātra} literature [\textit{Lakṣmītantra}], with instances of absorption and emission. In \textit{Kaula} as a system, this process of emission and absorption, similar to the \textit{Spanda} of Advaya Kashmir Śaivism, emphasis that it is Śakti that is the dynamic power behind this process in which Śiva is emitted and reabsorbed, and in the end these two, Śiva and Śakti (metaphorically), are the two aspects of a circle- one the inner and one the outer- that allows there to be a circle at all.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Dyczkowski, \textit{Canon}, 163. Dyczkowski notes that inter-sect mingling was unacceptable. One should only practice within ones own \textit{Kaula} lineage, and within that lineage no distinctions were to be made; another practice in line with the overall "tantric" practice of not recognizing caste distinctions.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} \textit{Srota}- Sanskrit term. "Currents of literature; scripture."
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
**Trika’s Relation to Kaula**

What is especially interesting is that Trika claims to be the culmination of *kula*, and *kaula*, meaning that it not only accepts these systems, but fully integrates and exceeds them. Practice moves beyond *Kula* worship centered on Śakti, beyond *kaula*, centered on the *parām kaulam*, and into a higher state. Dyczkowski sums up Abhinava's distinction between the dualist Śaivasiddhānta and the monist *kula* schools:

Thus whereas the former enjoins the performance of rituals and the observance of vows and rules governing outer conduct, the *kula* position is seen to be one of denying their validity and rejection of these outer forms in favor of inner spiritual discipline. Kula doctrine is essentially based, from this point of view, on an exclusivist monism (*advaya*) intolerant of contrasts, which thus rejects all forms of spiritual discipline that are 'external', that is, 'outside' in the state of duality. The Trika view, however, excels this because it is a supreme monism (*paramādvaya*) in which nothing needs to be pursued or even abandoned. Even if the ritual is performed, it does not break up the integrity of the absolute consciousness of the subject (TAA, vol. III, p. 288ff.). Nothing is here prohibited or enjoined insofar as whatever is pleasing is fit to lead to union with Siva:

\[\text{Muktikaamasya no kincin nisiddham vihitam ca no yad eva hrdayam tad yogyam sivasamvidabhedane}\]

(TAA, 15/29 1b-2a)

One could say that Trika is in this respect more intensely *Kaula* than the *kula* schools and so, in the same spirit, rejects the views that the divisions between *kaula* tradition are important.

While, as said before, the *Kula* forms a corpus of literature by itself, it nonetheless influenced and was influenced by the *Saivagamas*, especially the *Bhairavatantras*. It is no small wonder then that Abhinava's Trika indicates an affinity for certain *Saivagama*

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55 In response to what *Kula* designates as a broad current, Dyczkowski, *Canon*, 180-181 117 ff, writes: This use of the term is well exemplified by the contrast posited in the TAA between the Kula method or liturgy (*kulapratikriyā*) and the Tantric method (*tantrapratikriyā*). The former denotes Trika and Krama *Kaula* ritual in general; the latter all Tantric ritual that is free of Kaula elements, notably, the use of meat, wine and ritual intercourse. Their practices are aimed directly at the dis-solving of all apparent polarities which they would claim are unattributable to *paraśiva*.

56 Ibid., 171.
literature, especially the *Bhairavatantras*, while essentially being a *kaula* system. It is, perhaps, the result of the powerful syncretic nature of Trika in the hands of Abhinava, and the monistic tendency of these texts, likely a result of the *kaula* influence, that made this 'blending' possible. In response, it is no small mistake that *Kaula* should find itself attracted to, and accepted within, Śaiva sects more readily than other groups, definitely a result of the rather *kaula* like character of Śiva: i.e., the erotic ascetic, the wandering *yogi*, *Rudra*, *Bhairava*, etc.

**Krama**

The *Krama*\(^{57}\) system, also known as *kramasāsana*,\(^{58}\) *kramadarśana*, or *kramanaya* focuses on the "experience of the Arising of the Sequence of Kālīs (kalikramodaya)."\(^{59}\) While there has been a tendency among past scholars to situate the *Krama* as an altogether distinct system from the *kula*, current evidence seems to indicate

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\(^{57}\) Ibid., 77. Dyczkowski notes: 'Krama' like 'kula,' also conveys a broad generic meaning. It refers, in one sense, to the sequence of actions in *Kaula* ritual, the order of recitation of mantras, deposition (*nyāsa*) of letters or the seed-syllables of mantras on the body or on a *mandala*, image or other representation of the deity and its surrounding entourage such as a pitcher or the sacrificial fire pit. 'Krama' can also mean the liturgy or ritual itself and so is virtually synonymous with the term 'prakriyā'. Again the term 'Krama,' variously qualified, can serve as the appellation of a *Kaula* school. Thus the Kashmiri *Krama* system as a whole is at times called 'Kālikrama' although the term also refers to the order of the sequence of Kālī-ś worshipped in the course of certain rituals or as a series of states of consciousness. The term 'krama' lays emphasis on the typical ritual form a particular kaula school exhibits, while the term 'Kula' stresses its doctrinal affiliations and individual identity as a specific kaula tradition.

\(^{58}\) Gavin Flood, *Body and Cosmology in Kashmir Śaivism* (San Francisco, California: Mellen Research University Press, 1993), 145. Flood translates *Krama* as succession. This is an interesting and important aspect to grasp concerning *Krama*. *Krama*'s affiliation with Kālī, the goddess invariably associated with Kāla indicates the importance of temporality in *Krama* as a system.

\(^{59}\) Dyczkowski, *Canon*, 75.
the contrary. The ritual, as well as the doctrine, of Krama is indicative of the intricate connection that essentially proves that krama is a branch of kula. Krama, sometimes referred to as Kālikula, or kramakula, identified as Uttarāmnāya, espouses the "philosophy of absolute (anuttara) non-dual consciousness' which leads to liberation in this life in which freedom and enjoyment (mokṣa and bhoga) are united." In Krama ritual took on a new meaning by emphasizing identification "with Kālī who is the flow (krama) of the power of consciousness through the polarities of subject, object, and means of knowledge in consonance with their arising and falling away in each act of perception." Chapters three and four will be devoted to trying to make sense of this very practice.

Abhinava’s Trika

A Look at Abhinava’s Life

When discussing Abhinava it makes sense to view him not as the founder of any type of system; rather, we should see him as a systematizer, organizing and interpreting all that the Trika comprises. Conveniently for us, within his Parātrīśikā-vivarana, Abhinava includes a brief autobiography. While it is not complete, it allows a glimpse into the life of the great Trika teacher. In respect to the question of Abhinava’s status as a founder, we find a claim that what he has written, the Parātrīśikā commentary, is

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60 Ibid., 75.
61 Ibid., 75.
62 Dyczkowski, Vibration, 9.
“pregnant with the deliberation of the mystery of Trika,” indicating that the Trika system was around before him.63

Abhinava recounts that “Cukhula … who was averse to worldly affairs and whose heart was set on Śiva alone” was his father.64 Cukhula, the son of Varāhaupta from the lineage of Atrigupta of Kashmir was reputed to be a devout Śaiva worshipper.65 When Abhinava was just a boy, his mother, Vimalā, died.66 This is known to have had a profound effect on him, and was perhaps partially the cause of his extreme spiritual search. The family was well respected, most likely of the Brahmin caste. Abhinava recounts that his father, “him who had examined and understood the entire lot of categories and principles did obtain Abhinavagupta the human body sanctified by the supreme lord.”67 The autobiography relates a number of nyāya (pramāṇa), grammar (pada) and Mīmāṃsaka (vākya) teachers, as well as praise for the guru and goddess in right teaching and grace.

Mueller-Ortega’s history of Abhinava is a nice supplement to Abhinava’s autobiography. He remarks that Abhinava was known to study almost every subject available at the time. Some sources count at least twenty teachers, though this is not certain. He was said to have studied with Jain and Buddhist teachers, as well those

63 Bäumer, Parātrīśikā, 271. I am not exactly sure how to interpret this. At points, Abhinava claims absolute knowledge, at other times he seems less absolute in his claims to knowledge.
64 Ibid. , 271.
65 Ibid. , 271.
66 Muller-Ortega, Heart, 45.
67 Bäumer, Parātrīśikā, 271. One cannot help but wonder whether this claim is intended to convey more than it appears on the surface. I do not think we should take this remark as arrogance; rather, I believe it is an intimation of the theory of the Śiva nature of the universe and the a fortiori claim that what one does is Śiva in action.
expounding dualistic forms of Śaivism. His Kaula teacher was Sambunātha, who is
spoken of generally as his root guru.68 Others include

Lakṣmanagupta, disciple of the great Utpālādeva, under whom Abhinavagupta studied the doctrines of the Pratyabhijñā; Bhūtirāja, who is said to have taught Abhinavagupta the Krama system; Bhāskara, who taught Abhinavagupta the principles of the Spanda tradition, which goes back to the two great teachers, Vasugupta and Kallata; and Bhatta Tauta, Abhinavagupta’s teacher of poetics, drama, and philosophy of language.69

It seems that Abhinava received a well-rounded education by all accounts.

**Abhinava’s Work with Trika**

What Abhinava does with Trika is a beautiful synthesis; indeed, we might say that
the synthesis was completed before he stepped on the scene and he merely teased it out,
bringing it to light and fruition. While the essential texts of Trika do not know
themselves to be Trika, i.e., the mālinīvijayottara and the siddhayogeśvarīmata, they
nonetheless contain the doxa and praxy of Trika.70 In these pre-Trika proper texts we
already find reference to the essential Trika idea of the three goddesses: supreme (parā),
middling (parāparā), and lowest (aparā).71 What sets apart Abhinava's Trika, what
makes it the highest Trika (anuttaratrika) is the fact that it goes beyond Trika, i.e.,
beyond the triad of parā, parāparā, and aparā.72 It does not seem that any text
specifically refers to itself as Trika until the advent of Abhinava. The term Trika,
however, is mentioned in the Yoginīmatasāra, a text belonging to a kula lineage that
worshipped "kuleśvarī who 'devours the kumārikula."73 This tradition is said to transmit

68 Muller-Ortega, Heart, 45. Some claim Sambunātha was Abhinava’s Trika teacher. The inconsistency is
probably the result of the problematic nature of determining the exact relation between Trika and Kaula.
69 Ibid., 45.
70 Dyczkowski, Canon, 170, ff76.
71 Ibid., 170, ff 76.
72 Ibid., 180, ff 117.
73 Ibid., 180, ff #117.
the consciousness which pervades the sky of transcendental reality and through it Trika was brought into the world.\textsuperscript{74}

**Trika and Triads**

The particular method of worship in Trika Kula is unique only in the fact that it is the practice of those rituals that are generally found to be consented upon by all Kula sects. For our purposes, it is not necessary to go into intricacies of detail. Dyczkowski provides these in most of his works. What is interesting is that the center of the maṇḍala to be used during worship is inhabited by a triangle with the following specifically inscribed inscriptions: parā (supreme) at the apex, aparā (lower) in the lower right hand corner, and parāparā (middling) in the lower left hand corner. The triangle is represented of the "divine matrix (yoni)" in which resides Kuleśvarī in union with parānandabhairava. The vagina is the microcosmic equivalent of the triangle.\textsuperscript{75}

Triads are an important element of the Trika. We should recall that Trika literally means three. What is problematic is determining which triad the number three is to refer to. SenSharma relates the following triads of importance to the Trika system. They are:

1. It is said that of the sixty-four āgamas recognized as authoritative by this school, the triad (trika of the Maalinī, Siddha, and Nāmaka Āgamas is of greatest importance. In fact this monistic school of Śaivism is based on these three famous agamas; hence it is called the Trika.
2. This school venerates three important triads, viz., Śiva, Śakti and their union; or Śiva, Śakti, and Nara; or parā, aparā, and parāparā Śaktis; hence it is named the Trika system.
3. It explains three modes of the knowledge of reality, viz., non-dual (abheda), non-dual-cum-dual (bhedābheda), and dual (bheda); hence the name Trika.
4. The literature which has come down to us can be divided under three heads, viz., Āgama śastra, Śpanda śastra, and Pratyabhijñā śastra,

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 68. This may be where AKS gets the notion of the sky-wanderer (Khecari).

\textsuperscript{75} Dyczkowski, Canon, 81-82.
constituting the three streams which represent the three phases of development of this school that later merged to the Trika school.\textsuperscript{76}

There are others in addition to these. For instance, the triad of Śāmbhava, Śākta, and Ānava, three patterns of ritual, as well as the three correspondences to will, knowledge and action. Dyczkowski remarks, and rightly so it seems,

It was Sambhunātha—Abhinavagupta’s Trika master—who gave him the basic exegetical Trika-based model upon which the culminating work of the Trika tradition—the Tantraloka—is based. Again it appears that it was largely due to him that Trika was taken to be the apogee of monist Kashmiri Śaivism, for there can be no doubt that Trika is far from the central focus of monist Kashmiri Śaivism before Abhinavagupta.\textsuperscript{77}

This indicates that those Advaya Kashmiri sects represented through the Pratyabhijñā, or the Spanda school, and largely based in the Śivasūtras, did not understand Trika to be at their center. It does seem that Trika was already defining itself as the height and transcendence of Kaula in a number of texts before Abhinava's time. It is only with Abhinava that we see the Trika presented as the height, center, and culmination of the Saivāgama tradition, as was already recognized within certain kaula schools.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{76} Deba Brata SenSharma, \textit{The Philosophy of Sādhanā} (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1990), 11.
\textsuperscript{77} Dyczkowski, \textit{Canon}, 86.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 187.
CHAPTER 2: AKS COSMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

"God does not play dice with the universe."
-Albert Einstein

[T]his notion of the god at play- specifically, at dice- is one of the most central and expressive veins in the metaphysics exfoliated through the centuries in many idioms and modes around him [Śiva].

This chapter will explore the tattva schema found in AKS. I intend to explain each tattva, as well as the process of emission and absorption (spanda) that gives rise to these tattva-s. This exploration is necessary in order to understand my reading of the AKS theory of perception.

Methodological Points of Concern

A few points need to be kept in mind as this section is read. Firstly, within AKS there are numerous terms that are interchangeably used to refer to the same concept. Specific term usage usually depends on the specific lineage and sub-school a writer belonged to. For instance, Abhinava will rarely refer to the ultimate as Paramaśiva generally choosing to designate this concept with the name Bhairava. Similarly within the Spanda school and among those writers strongly associated with the Spanda school, we generally see the role of Śakti subsumed under the title Spanda with little, if any, actual change in the concept or its functions. For this work, I have chosen to use those

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terms that are most likely to show up in Abhinava's work, as my obsession and devotion is mainly centered on him. Whenever a concept has more than one signifier I will include the various possible designating terms within a footnote at the first point of use.

Secondly, in reference to how I present the AKS cosmological and metaphysical system, I ask the reader to remember that it is inaccurate to think of the following description of this metaphysical system as temporally unfolding, and it is similarly misguided to attempt to rank the tattva-s as higher and lower in an absolute sense. Regardless of this, we will find ourselves quite confused without the aid of some structure to describe the system. As a remedy I will present the concept of Bhairava first, simply because it is the Ultimate (Anuttara) principle. It is so ultimate in fact that it is not even a principle; rather, it is the source of all that is, be it conceptual, spiritual or physical. Not only is Bhairava the source of all, it is the all. I will then proceed to describe each successive tattva that exhibits a move of manifestation within Paramaśiva. We must remember that ultimately these moves of manifestation, or expressions of Bhairava are never moves out of Bhairava, as nothing ever moves out of Bhairava because it is by definition the ground of all possibility. Along with these brief descriptions of the traits unique to each tattva, I will briefly explain what occurs in order for the emission of manifestation to proceed.

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80 This remark is borrowed from Des Sharma. I agree that it seems correct that this process may not occur within time as it occurs within Bhairava and Bhairava is not limited by time; however, I fail to see that this necessarily implies that there are no temporally successive events that occur.

81 The term tattva-s literally translates as “Thatness,” from “tat” [that] and “tvam” [ness]. However, a slew of other possible translations are available: “Categories of experience,” “Categories of existence,” “Constituent of the universe,” and “principle.”

82 Perhaps this necessity is the result of our inability to conceptually cognize without the aid of spatiality and temporality.

83 Anuttara: ultimate; highest; supreme.
Shantatita Kala: Bhairava’s Abode; "Beyond Even Peace"

Bhairava: Anuttara

Bhairava[^84] is often described as "pure illumination (Śuddha Prakāśa) that is self-luminous (sphurat) and self revealed (svayamprakāśita)."[^85] What this means is that Bhairava, which is none other than consciousness (caitanya)[^86] has the characteristic of reflexive illumination (vimarśaprakāśa), reflexive illumination in the literal sense that Bhairava illuminates its self. This understanding of the nature of Bhairava places AKS in a unique position; caitanya, the ultimate principle, the ground, the source as it were, is both static and dynamic; its dynamic aspect is its self-revealing power (Śuddha Vimarśa) generally referred to as Śakti,[^87] its static aspect pure illumination (Śuddha prakāśa), called Śiva.[^88] In Bhairava these two aspects of caitanya are in a state of equilibrium.

Bhairava, i.e., consciousness (caitanya), takes itself as its object. An account such as this escapes the problem inherent to other descriptions of "pure consciousness"
by allowing intentionality to be intrinsic in the sense that it [consciousness] is directed upon itself. This directedness, or bending back of consciousness onto, and into itself, means that consciousness inherently manifests itself.\textsuperscript{89} Self-illumination (svapprakāśa) is the condition necessary for the possibility of a consciousness that expresses itself in various modes of manifestation. It also affords us the ability to ascribe a purely passive state to Bhairava, while simultaneously claiming it is active, i.e., creative. We now need to explore what is meant by "illuminating" in order to clarify the aforementioned claims.

\textsuperscript{89} See J.N. Mohanty, \textit{Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought} (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 50-51. Mohanty makes a number of remarks about the possibility of consciousness as transcendental in response to the possibility of intentional consciousness playing a transcendental role. What he ends up with is the claim that "The true transcendental is not the alleged pure consciousness but the generalized consciousness-in-general -- object-in-general structure." He then remarks: "The only place, but for that reason not less important, in Indian thought to look for this concept is Kashmir Śaivism, which, after distinguishing between various grades of consciousness, speaks of consciousness' inherent tendency to posit an object." I would like to add two more remarks by Mohanty that I think apply to my study. He writes: "Although consciousness is formless (niārkāra) in the sense of lacking real content, it has an intentional content or logical 'qualifier' (prakāra), permitting a logical analysis of its structure.... Consciousness is self-illuminating [svapprakāśa] in the (weak) sense of possessing a pre-reflective transparency. Reflection can always objectify it, but such objectification is no new discovery. It is rather a clarification of what one was already familiar with." In conversation Brad Bassler brought to light the pre-objective nature of Mohanty's description of consciousness and its incompatibility with my claim that consciousness posits its own object. I would like to respond to this point. The notion of Caitanya bending back and taking itself as an object is compatible with Mohanty's description of consciousness-in-general -- object-in-general. What this means is that consciousness is inherently directed towards an object. Now, we need to remember that within AKS it is generally accepted that all things that we experience are within our field of awareness, and because of the Śāhōpala argument [see p. 80-81] that those things occurring within the same field are of the same nature, then a fortiori, all possible objects of awareness are necessarily of the nature of awareness [I am here using awareness as a translation of caitanya]. Even in Bhairava, prior to first move of involution there is already awareness of an object but it conforms to the consciousness (awareness)-in-general -- object-in-general structure that Mohanty has spoken of. For this reason, I would refer to this stage as pre-objective because the intentional object is not really an object; rather it is a generalized object, which is composed of the same "stuff" as the consciousness perceiving it. This would be the closest we come to a notion of pure consciousness in AKS. Mohanty, \textit{Reason}, 51. Mohanty's remark about the self-illuminative nature of consciousness in "the (weak) sense of possessing a pre-reflective transparency. [in which]. Reflection can always clarify it, but such objectification is no new discovery. It is rather a clarification of what one was already familiar with" also seems compatible with the AKS notion of caitanya. In AKS caitanya is self-illuminative in just the sense Mohanty speaks of, caitanya does not require another act of awareness to make what is available available. Ibid., 50. As Mohanty says "A state of consciousness is self-intimating only in the sense that its owner has a pre-reflective acquaintance with it, or, what amounts to the same, the state of consciousness has a pre-reflective transparency." For instance, I look at the picture. I then may reflect upon various aspects of the picture, but the aspects I am reflecting upon were available when I first became aware of the picture. All I am doing is "focusing" on different aspects that were available in my first encounter. All that this pre-reflective transparency entails is that whatever my subsequent reflection may be, what is reflected upon was already given prior to reflection. AKS seems to fit this bill.
The role of consciousness as manifester, or illuminator is important to understand. By illumination is meant the ability to make manifest, much like a flashlight makes objects appear (manifest) in the dark. However, with caitanya, what makes manifest and what becomes manifest, as well as the process of manifestation are ultimately, and in the strictest sense not separate; all three are simultaneous and indivisible. In fact, we should not even think of these three aspects; illuminator, illumination and illumined as three things or processes and instead recognize that they are three expressions of the one consciousness (caitanya). This point needs to be kept in mind from the beginning, though a thorough understanding is not necessary.

One way to account for the validity of the claim that illumination, illuminator and illumined are not different is the doctrine of antarātavāda which maintains that everything is internal (antaratva) to consciousness, meaning that all experienced events occur within consciousness. This theory is specifically intriguing for it seems applicable as an ontological theory [if we take caitanya to be something like a substance (dravya)] as well as an epistemological theory [if we understand that what is occurring is perception, and that it is occurring within the field, or sensorium of consciousness]. One

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90 I do not mean for "not separate" to be taken as equivalent to "not different."
91 In fact, at the time I am finishing this chapter, I am beginning to suspect that attempting to understand the tattvas 30-36, and especially this notion of Bhairava is misguided and doomed to fail. I suspect this because all of these concepts (if we can even call them concepts) "occur" (and I am not sure in what sense of the word occur this occurring is to be) before the emission of the Kaṭṭhukas, the coverings that make possible experience as experience is normally thought, as well as conceptualization, which seems to be based in space and time, two of the four Kalas. One may wish to look at Kant's work concerning these very things as beings conditions for the possibility of certain types of perceptions and cognitions in The Critique of Pure Reason.
92 Dyczkowski, Vibration, 46. See addendum 4. Here, I make some remarks from Dan Lusthaus' work on Yogacara that may prove enlightening in reference to AKS.
way to approach this point is to claim that on the macrocosmic level this is an ontological account, on the microcosmic level it is an epistemological account.93

**Bhairava as a Divinity**

*Bhairava* is commonly referred to as *Maheśvara*. This is because of its Śakti nature; for it is through this nature that *Bhairava* is said to be "free [svātantrya] from any kind of restriction or limitation."94 Because of its inherent Śakti nature, *Bhairava* is said to be full (*pūrṇa*). This fullness *Bhairava* embodies is the result of the self-illuminative nature, coupled with the fact that nothing ever occurs outside of *Bhairava*. *Bhairava* is *pūrṇa* because it realizes that there is nothing outside of itself. In this way, all possibility is experienced, not necessarily conceptually, but instead, by virtue of the fact that *Bhairava* is aware that whatever could be manifested (the universe, for instance) would, by virtue of the fact it is manifested (as *Bhairava* is self-manifesting manifestation), be essentially the same as *Bhairava*.

I believe SenSharma is correct when he states that Śakti is the essence of the divinity95 of *Bhairava*, for it is responsible for revealing the glory of the static aspect96 of

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93 What is most interesting is that it just may be the case that an epistemological account is nothing other than an ontological account for the AKS. This possibility of this suggestion rests on the status of the object in AKS. See section 3.4.b. In conversation Glenn Wallis asked how this position of two accounts could ever be verified. I believe the only possible proof may be as follows: 1) understand that epistemologically we are only privileged to what is given in our field of perception. We prove this through experience, then use the *Sahopala* argument to argue for the single nature of the locus in which everything in our field must occur. This would include the subject, objects, and acts of perception. We then would have to account for differentiation in experienced objects in some way that conclusively allows for the nature of phenomena to be both as they appear and also different. I am thinking that a primary nature of emptiness or fashionability would work. We then conclude an epistemology in which we fashion "fashionability," recognize the subject to be fashionable and acts of perception to be fashionable, then claim that the fashionable is really a fashioning because of the observable state of flux found in experience. We could never make certain remarks about the beginnings of the universe because that would not be a part of our privileged experience, but we could recognize that it is the case that this is how we experience our "worlds," and therefore says something about the nature of reality and the nature of knowledge. We gain knowledge in the same way that things become: we fashion and are fashioned.


95 Ibid., 20.
Bhairava, illumination (prakāśa). Bhairava is attributed five qualities, each one consistent with a particular Śakti that allows it to arise. The five are: consciousness (cit), bliss (ānanda), will (icchā), knowledge (jñāna), and action (kriyā) Śakti-s. Cit Śakti is the most inherent aspect; this is the power of the self-revelation of Bhairava. It is eternal (nitya) in that caitanya never ceases revealing itself, as it is the nature of caitanya to "self-reveal." As said earlier, the experiencing of itself as full, the result of self-revelation of itself as all, leads to a feeling of bliss within Bhairava. In this state the Lord (Bhairava) feels no desire for movement, as all that could be experienced constantly is. Icchā Śakti (power of will) allows the lord to create or do whatever it deems. This ability to act freely is the condition that allows Bhairava to move. Though Bhairava has no want or need to move, it still may do so because of its ability to desire (icchā) to move (create) simply because it desires to. This is commonly referred to as\textsuperscript{97} 'creation as play (krīḍā or līlā).'

Jñāna Śakti is what allows for the transcendent aspect\textsuperscript{98} of Bhairava, even during a moment of manifestation, for this is what allows Bhairava to experience objects manifested by itself in relation to itself. This power of knowledge is the ability of Bhairava to realize that even during manifestation, when the experiencer has been juxtaposed to the experienced, there is still a thread that unifies.\textsuperscript{99} Because of this, Bhairava is never deluded into dualistic experience; therefore it is able to remain transcendent when all else is fully engaged in the immanent project of universe-manifestation (viśva). Kriyā Śakti proper is Bhairava's taking of the stage of the manifest

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 20. SenSharma's remarks on the Śiva/Śakti nature of Anuttara.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 42.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 20. See earlier remarks on how to understand transcendence as I take it.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 23.
universe. *Bhairava* plays every role in this show, including the role of transcendent observer (*Bhairava*). Again, the concept of *līlā* works well here, as the lord has created simply so that it may play with itself, and paradoxically for itself.\(^{100}\)

There are two manners in which Śakti functions within the supreme lord (*Bhairava*). First, Śakti may be identified with *Bhairava* and plays the role of pure self-revelation; that is, *caitanya* only reveals itself. This may be equated to Śakti purely revealing the illuminative capacity (*prakāśa*) of *Bhairava* to *Bhairava*. Śakti supplies the reflexivity (*vimarśa*) necessary for *caitanya* to take itself as an intentional object.

Because Śakti is inherent to *Bhairava* (*caitanya*), we could say that *caitanya* reveals itself to itself. Therefore, this revelation is of the "nature of self experience (svānubhava)."\(^{101}\) Because of the fullness (*pūrṇatā*) experienced in and by *Bhairava*, this experience is solely of the "I", as there is no other distinct from it. Not even possibilities are distinct because "all" is revealed as the "all." This feeling of fullness with the experience of the "I" is dependent upon a realization that there is none other outside of it. Again, this is the function of the *jñāna kriyā* in all phases of manifestation, that *Bhairava* always be aware of its fullness as a result of the unity of all.

There is a second manner in which Śakti functions within *Bhairava*. This way is as the manifestation of the universe.

The process of the manifestation of the universe can be described in this manner from Parama siva's [*Bhairava's*] point of view. The Supreme Lord, exercising his free will, reveals himself to himself—which is the same as his Śakti—as the universe. Obviously, the self-revelation of Parama Siva [*Bhairava*] as universe is only a manifestation of his

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100 Many of us are involved in this sort of play in our daily lives. For example, when I sing to myself in the shower I create for a number of reasons. I am the experiencer; I sing for me. I am the singing; it is I who sings. In this way I have fulfilled all the roles, as well as the one for whom it is created for, and I have done so for no other reason that play, simple enjoyment. See Handelman and Shulman, *God*.

immanent aspect, i.e., Sakti as universe, which lies prior to manifestation, as absorbed in and identified with his Essence. To Parama Siva [Bhairava], the manifestation of universe appears, as it were, as a mode of his self-experience, since he is the ultimate Experiencer (para-pramātā) and the spectator (Sakṣī) of this self-manifestation. So we see that manifestation of the universe and the experience of itself as the universe does not negate Bhairava's experience as aham, or "I." In fact, the two are not different; the experience of itself as "I" includes all possibility of manifestation and therefore includes the experience of the universe as experience of "I."

*Bhairava's Līlā* is the result of specific actions it takes. These moves can be described by the five specific functions (kṛtyas) of Bhairava. These five functions, which are activated by Śakti, comprise the processes of emission, emission being the process of expansion and contraction of the modes [tattva-s] of Bhairava's manifestation. This process, a constant pulsation, is what is commonly referred to as Spanda. The five kṛtyas comprising Bhairava's absolute freedom (svātantrya) are: nigraha, sṛṣṭi, sthiti, samhāra, and anugraha. Nigraha is the self-imposed limitations Bhairava places on itself. This limitation is "due to the cessation of self-revelatory power (vimarśa Śakti)." This results in the loss of the feeling of fullness that Bhairava experiences, and is replaced by a sense of "I" (aham) as opposed to a vague sense of "other," which at this point has taken no form. It is, in a sense, aham opposed to śūnya, which works well because it is this "other", the śūnya, that allows space for a specific to arise, namely idam (object).

The manifestation of "object" (idam) in the space of the void is the first move of the sṛṣṭi function. Strictly speaking, no actual duality exists at this point; ahamta and idamta are simply the two extreme polar points of experience. More so, at this stage,
idamta, or not-self, is not really able to be experienced; it is eclipsed by the power of ahamta. In the stthiti stage, the ahamta and idamta are equally open to experience. This is what could rightly be termed the manifest universe. Indeed, this is what may also be called saṃsāra as we are likely to accept these two aspects as equally real, when the truth may be more like they are equally unreal. We stand to "forget" most in this stage, as we are prone to see the ahamta and idamta as independent, self-existing entities.\footnote{Forget in the sense of not having re-cognized. Later, I will argue that this is the sense in which we should understand delusion.} The state of forgottenness is saṃsāra. For this reason, Kṣemeranda labels those wandering in this stage saṃsārinṣ.\footnote{Opposed to this state is that of the kṣetrajñā, literally, the "Knower of the field", the field being the field of awareness. These knowers would be those not considered as saṃsārinṣ.} The fourth stage, termed saṁhāra, is the beginning of absorption. At this point idamta is brought into and absorbed by the ahamta. However, absorption is still not complete as there still remains limitation; this process continues to repeat itself. It is only in the last stage, the anugraha, when Bhairava ends its self-limitation, that this cycle will cease and Bhairava will wholly return to its original state.

Based on the "qualities," or powers, of Bhairava, we see that Bhairava can essentially do whatever it wills, and can will whatever it may. It is because of these capabilities that Bhairava sometimes decides to reveal himself in certain manners; most importantly to us, Bhairava's resolve to reveal itself as the universe. The freedom that Bhairava embodies includes the ability freely to will its resolve as well as the ability to fulfill its resolve through actions. The revelation of the universe is simply the making manifest of the universe through its own power of self-revelation by means of its Śakti. The manifestation of the universe, which strictly speaking is the illumination of the universe, is no different than the self-illumination of Bhairava that is, if we recall from...
earlier, inherent to its nature. *Caitanya* always illumines itself; therefore, anything that is illumined is nothing but *caitanya*. When *Bhairava* reveals itself to itself by itself, as it always does because that is its nature, it simultaneously reveals all possibilities of manifestation as manifestations. Again, it is because this is the case that *Bhairava* is said to be full. Every revelation of itself is a revelation of all manifestation.

As long as the idea and experience of the universe remains a pure possibility, the revelation of the universe as not other than the fullness of *Bhairava*, there is essentially no divine lord. At this point, there is just *caitanya*; *caitanya* becomes divine as soon as there is a will of resolve. As soon as there is resolve, *caitanya* becomes or assumes the role as the divine lord, the spectator of what is manifested. In this role, as the supreme lord, *Bhairava* remains transcendent to *viśva*.

**Reflections and Remarks on Bhairava as a Divinity**

Before we move on, a problematic area must be addressed: the Theistic aspect of *Bhairava*. For certain reasons, I am inclined to believe that the notions of *Bhairava* that seem to imply a dualistic theism are merely heuristic devices. However, the point of this work is not to defend this claim, so I will present the following points that are suggestive of theism, but would ask that the reader not be too quick to commit themselves to a position on this area without further study. The previous remarks may best be read as attributes of *Bhairava* that explain its transcendent nature, as well as setting up the possible causes of its move towards emission. These however, need only be addressed if we are to recognize some point in time at which emission begins, which is generally

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106 This point is literally when manifestation has not yet "progressed" beyond the thirtyfirst *tattva*. For this reason, the *tattva*-s leading to this point are referred to as those of the pure order.

107 In what way *Bhairava* is transcendent remains problematic. I would, however, not say transcendent ontologically, at least not as this is normally taken, but rather epistemologically transcendent.

108 See addendum 2 for more remarks on the de-theizing, or de-personalizing of Śiva.
rejected in lieu of a claim of an always occurring universe. This leads one to question why there was the need to attempt to explain what Bhairava is like before emission (before our universe).\textsuperscript{109}

One possible answer may be that this description of Bhairava prior to emission is somehow connected to the transcendent aspect of Bhairava. It may be that this is something like an account of what it is like to embody Bhairava; that is, to experience fullness, etc. Another reason for this account is connected with the first reason. While it seems to be the case that these "attributes" of Bhairava are necessary conditions to explain manifestation on a macrocosmic level, it seems to follow that on a microcosmic level they serve as the very conditions necessary to embody Bhairava. For example, for one to "become" Bhairava, that is, to embody Bhairava, one must embody this fullness. Likewise, the conditions under which emission "begins" might also correlate our (the limited individual subject: anu's) process of perception. Recall that, "perception … is just the illumination of the objective world, which, by nature, is divided up into two groups, namely, the knowable subjects and knowable objects".\textsuperscript{110} The condition for the beginning of this perception on the macrocosmic level is the result of these characteristics of Bhairava; namely, its will, resolve, and desire. Similarly, these attributes may ultimately be responsible for our individual acts of perception in a similar manner. So what appears to be a description of a theistic conception of Bhairava, may indeed be so; however, it may also function, and quite possibly, may only be intended to function, as a heuristic in an account of the process of perception.

\textsuperscript{109} The attributes of Bhairava are indicators of what Bhairava was before emission, so in this sense there is overwhelming evidence of an explanation of Bhairava prior to emission. In fact, these attributes are what are considered responsible for the "first" movements.

\textsuperscript{110} Muller-Ortega, Heart, 209.
SenSharma offers some thoughts on this matter. He writes:

Strictly speaking, it is not possible, according to the Trika view, to describe how exactly the Supreme lord [Bhairava] conducts this lila in the form of universal manifestation, that is how he actually accomplishes the task of his self-concealment and thus makes himself appear (abhāsayati) as limited subjects (pramātā) and objects (prameya) in creation. The reason for holding this view is twofold. First, the act of self-concealment (svarūpagopanam), being an act of divine freedom (svātantra), is indescribable by its very nature. It cannot be described, for instance, from the standpoint of the Parama Śiva [Bhairava] because, strictly speaking, he is not aware of its being accomplished, as it is actually accomplished in a moment. Nor can it be described from the standpoint of the limited individual being who cannot even be aware of it. Second, the act of self-concealment is not a temporal process; it is an instantaneous and unitive act which has neither beginning in time nor stages or steps involved in its actual accomplishment. It is a unique act of divine freedom (svātantra).  

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**Shanta Kala: The Pure Order; "Phases of Peace"**

**Śiva Tattva**

The first five Tattvas are the Śiva Tattva, Śakti Tattva, Sadāśiva tattva, Īśvara Tattva, and Sad-Vidyā Tattva. All five belong to the Shanta Kala; that is, the phase of Peace. This kala is also referred to as the Śaktyanda (sphere of Śakti), or the Suddha-adhva (Pure Order). These tattvas are said to comprise the germinal state (bijāvasthā) of manifestation. In this phase Śakti has not yet involuted into matter. The idam aspect is not yet manifested as separate from the aham; rather, the possibility of an aham as opposed to idam is experienced as a possibility within Bhairava. In virtually no way, even on a conventional level, is there an ontological duality, though there is a concept of the possibility of idam as opposed to aham by the emission of the Sad-Vidyā tattva.

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111 SenSharma, Sādhanā, 42.
112 Also called the Sadākhyya Tattva.
113 Also called the Suddha-Vidyā Tattva.
Śivaśakti Tattva-s

As stated above, the first move towards the manifestation of the universe is the necessary limitation of Bhairava's sense of fullness in order to create a sense of want (abhāva). This limitation is caused by the Śakti tattva, that is, the power of negation i.e., niṣedha. In turn Bhairava is effectively limited to Śiva tattva. At this point Bhairava is the same as it was prior to the effect of the Śakti tattva, except there is a loss of the feeling of fullness. Śiva tattva is caitanya proper, and in this way lacks the ability to reveal anything else but itself. This however presents a problem, for this is what is said of Bhairava also. It seems that what is limited as a result of the limitation of Bhairava's fullness is Bhairava's capacity to recognize its aspect as infinitely manifesting all, simply by manifesting itself.¹¹⁴ So what seems to be the limiting factor is more of a limitation of understanding; Bhairava has removed its knowledge of its capability and nature as full (pūrṇa). Cit Śakti is fully active during this phase, constantly revealing itself to itself, but only as itself. This further increases the sense of pure "I" with no category whatsoever to juxtapose its experience with. No "I am full" as was realized in Bhairava; only "I". In this way Śiva tattva is pervaded with a sense of rest (viśrasnti). Because of this loss of the sense of fullness, there begins a will towards a resolve, a movement towards movement so that whatever is not experienced may be experienced.

We should remember that caitanya is of the unitary nature of self-revealing illumination. Therefore it logically follows that this suppression of the fullness of the self- experience of Bhairava by Bhairava is as dependent upon the Śiva tattva as it is

¹¹⁴ Though, in some ways Bhairava is always aware of its fullness because it is also always transcendent. In fact, this would perhaps be the only notion of transcendence, epistemological transcendence as a result of a remembrance of fullness. I would also like to connect fullness with utter recognition of the state of "things" as fashionable. The idea of fashionable will be developed in chapter three. Again, I remind the reader that we will certainly encounter problematic claims in this cosmology.
upon the Śakti tattva. But it is, nonetheless, the dynamic Śakti function of limitation that allows these two tattvas to arise simultaneously. The interconnected work and results of the Śiva and Śakti tattvas are so closely connected that it is not uncommon to find these two tattvas presented as the ŚivaŚakti tattva. In fact, what is described as happening in these two stages seems to be constantly happening in Bhairava, even before Śakti activates a limitation of Bhairava's fullness. It seems that these two tattva-s are merely the natures of caitanya. If this is the case, then in a sense the process of manifestation has not really begun at the Śiva or Śakti tattva. All that has happened is a recognition of a possibility through the limitation of fullness, possibly the result of the will, resolve and action of Bhairava as the supreme lord.

Both the Śiva and Śakti tattva are eternal; they have no point of dissolution for they are the inherent interconnected natures of Bhairava presented as two separately occurring, independently existing principles. One is left to wonder why these aspects are even referred to as tattva-s. Because of the nature of these two tattvas, that they never dissolve, they are said to remain in Bhairava as the seeds (bījas) of the possibly manifest universe.¹¹⁵

**Sādākhya Tattva**

The next tattva is the sādākhya tattva. While there was only the experience of "I" (aham) during the Śiva and Śakti tattva-s, now there is the experience of the aham as becoming. Becoming in this sense implies a relation to something else. Aham now has an opposite to be identified with, and realized against, namely "object" (idam). What the idam is remains somewhat elusive; however, the sense of something other opposed to and

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¹¹⁵ In response Brad Bassler has reminded me that seeds are actual as seeds, but only possible as what they may become.
separate from aham is unmistakable. This reinforces the creation of the "I" as essentially an "I am this [thing]" (ahameva idam). At this point Śakti has begun its function as srṣṭi through the power of Icchā Śakti. Icchā Śakti is dominant at this stage because of the will to experience whatever it is that is "outside" of the aham. In this way, Icchā functions to create a resolve (saṅkalpa) towards movement and activity (kriyā) so that what is other may be "more" manifest so that aham may experience it.

Íśvara Tattva

Through this movement the idam moves to a higher level of importance. Now it is such a prominent feature of experience that Bhairava has the sense of idameva aham (this [thing] am I). Bhairava may now know his glory of creator to the fullest, for the idam, so dark and elusive in the Sādākhya tattva, is fully apparent. Bhairava now glimpses itself as the experiencer and experienced. For this reason, this tattva is named the Íśvara tattva. Not surprisingly jñāna sakti takes reign at this point, allowing Bhairava the total capacity of knowing its relation to idam. Bhairava has now experienced the polar opposites of experience at their extreme ranges, idameva aham and ahameva idam. The next move is an equalization into what is commonly called the Sad-Vidyā, or Suddha-vidyā tattva.

Sad-Vidyā Tattva

This tattva is marked by the experience "I am this [thing], this [thing] am I."

Kriyā Śakti is dominant in this stage as the simple movement of cognizing the differences of idam and aham and realizing their identity. The realization and experience of

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116 SenSharma, Sādhanā, 36.
117 SenSharma states that there is mental activity; however, I find this problematic, for we do not engage mental activity proper until the later tattva-s. I take this to mean that within illumination is the ability to cognize, though I am not sure to what extent. In fact, I am not sure in what way any of these tattvas can be
bhedābheda (diversity in unity) marks the point of non-duality. From this point onwards what is experienced is duality in manifestation, or duality of aham and idam. All of the above powers of Śakti are cit Śakti. They are powers of consciousness. Additionally, all of the above may be seen as the forming of the "idea" to manifest the universe. It is a simple planning, really. What follows is the actualization of the idea.

Vidya Kala: Māyā’s Abode; The Five Kañchukas Resulting in Purusa

The Kañchukas

The Māyānda (Sphere of Māyā) is the first move in the materializing of the previously mentioned concept of subject-object polarization held within Bhairava. Prior to this point we have been discussing the pure order (Śuddha-vidyā). "[T]he manifestation from this point onwards is called the Aśuddhādhvan- the Impure and Imperfect Way or Order- and also the Māyādhvan, the Māyā's Way." This phase is commonly called the Vidyā-kala, and it is here that the limited individualized "knowers", the Puruṣas, become manifested. This stage is also referred to as the sprouting stage (ankurāvastha). Bhairava lays down the divine resolve (bhedā saṅkalpa) to make multiplicity appear. Śakti, always making happen what is resolved, functions as the "power to obscure" through material form (jāda śakti) in order to make manifest this multiplicity.

cognized. This seems to be the problem of trying to make this process theistic; a proper deconstruction of theism in this system would prove useful in order to allow consistency and coherency. I have discussed this idea at length with Sonam Kachru and I am thankful for his insight. Some questions to ponder: The experiencer takes note? What does it mean to experience? Is not cognition necessary? This is not an attribute? In fact, what if no thoughts? There are no thoughts in the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth tattva-s. Perhaps the spanda of caitanya is what properly composes thought.

118 It is still questionable to me in what sense we should understand the term "object." Should we understand object to be phenomenal object, or phenomenal object as ontological object?
119 Chatterji, Kashmir, 35.
Bhairava begins actualization of the manifestation of the universe by way of māyā śakti. The māyā śakti is sometimes referred to as one of the Śuddha order, primarily because it is "one and universal by nature"; however, it differs from the other Śuddha tattva-s in that it is a "move" in the actualization phase, whereas the other Śuddha tattva-s are all occurrences within the ideal, or planning stage of viśva creation. Here there is a further forgetting of the Aham; so much so that there is no longer a realization as aham, rather the experiencing of numerous limited experiencers (anu-s). The limitation of each experiencer is connected to the fact that no one experiencer, save Bhairava, has access to experience of the universe in toto. Instead, there are multiple experiencers having multiple experiences with various aspects of the universe. This is the result of māyā, which effectively functions through five different limiting factors (Kañchukas).

The limited subject (cidaṇu)\(^{120}\) is essentially the result of a mistaken identity with the idam. As a result, the limited subject (aham bhava) begins to identify characteristics of the idam with itself. Simultaneously, the divine aspects of Bhairava are turned upside down and effectively begin to function as binding factors (pāsa-s). Specifically, these limiting factors (kañchukas) that bind the supreme experiencer (Bhairava) to the point of experiencing itself as many distinct limited experiencers (cidaṇu-s) are: "Kalā (limited authorship), vidyā (limited consciousness), raga (limited interest), kāla (limitation with regard to time), and niyati (limitation with regard to space)."\(^{121}\) These replace the divine

\(^{120}\) SenSharma, Sādhanā, 44. Cidaṇu: literally, non-spatial point of consciousness. The name, and description, of the limited subject (puruṣa; also aham bhava).

\(^{121}\) Ibid. , 38.
attributes of "omnipotence (sarva-karṣṭva), omniscience (sarva jñāntvā), self-contentment (pūrṇatvā), eternity (nityatvā), and omnipresence (vyāpakatvā)."

**Puruṣa Tattva**

The idam now plays the role of both subject and object, or rather, puruṣa and prakṛti. These two tattva-s are simultaneously created through māyāśakti. Puruṣa is the self-limited experiencer (para pramātā) that was formerly the Supreme experiencer (characterized by the Śiva tattva). In all actuality this is still the case; however, the puruṣa is not aware that this is so. All of these limitations seem to be cognitive limitations in that nothing has actually changed ontologically; it is only in perception and experience that we experience these limitations and what results from them, i.e., subject object dichotomy.

With māyā we see the first instances of a multiplicity of experiencers (puruṣas) as well as a limitless number of individual material complexes (prakṛti-s) for these puruṣa-s. Each puruṣa is a separate and distinct non-spatial point (aṇu). They must be non-spatial, as Chateerjee insists, because they are limited aspects of the non-spatial Bhairava. At this point we can properly refer to the puruṣa as a being, a being in the sense of something experiencing in the way that we normally talk about experience. It is only through the kañchukas that experience is possible. In the Śuddhādhyā (pure order) what is experienced is really more like absorption into, or of, Bhairava. But with the puruṣa there is the experiencing of "something." The puruṣa and prakṛti are Śiva and

122 Ibid., 38.
123 In contrast to Orthodox Sāṃkhya, each Puruṣa has a prakṛti; so there are a limitless number of puruṣa-s and prakṛti-s. See Chatterji, Kashmir, 34. He writes: "The all experiencer [Bhairava] becomes the Puruṣa, to use the technical language of the system, following the [shining out] abhāsa process which leaves entirely unaffected the primary, as well as each successively originating source, even when products come into manifestation."
124 Chatterji, Kashmir, 47.
Śakti, aham and idam, in a more contracted and limited form. Chaterjee remarks that puruṣa becomes identified with prakṛti to the point of forgetting itself.¹²⁵

Pratishta Kala: The Base of Phenomenal Existence:

Prakṛti Tattva

Prakṛti is whatever can be objectively perceived; but we should remember that what may be objectively perceived is never anything other than a manifestation of consciousness (caitanya). While prakṛti is responsible for the moving to action of the puruṣa, much as Śakti performs the function of actualization within Bhairava, initially there is no feeling or gravitation towards any type of movement. In the prakṛti tattva there is only the feeling by puruṣa, of prakṛti, as something 'generally experienced' (bhoga sāmānya).¹²⁶ This vague sense of a very generic feeling is the result of the suspension of movement of prakṛti by maintaining a state of equilibrium among the guṇa-s. Because prakṛti originally provides only a vague and indefinite experience, a generalized experience if you will, in all successive stages of manifestation it is prakṛti, and only prakṛti that is manifested and thereby open to experience.¹²⁷ At this point, while the prakṛti is equilibrated, each limited puruṣa is asleep;¹²⁸ it is only with a disturbance of the equalized guṇa-s within prakṛti that the puruṣa awakes.

The puruṣa/prakṛti complex, that is, the limited individual subject, is composed of internal and external organs. The "inner organ of mentation (antahkarana)… consists of

¹²⁵ Ibid. , 65. Another level of self-forgetting?
¹²⁶ Ibid. , 51.
¹²⁷ Ibid. , 51.
¹²⁸ I am not sure how to take this "asleep". It actually seems illogical that the Puruṣa would be said to be asleep; it is, after all, the localized individual Bhairava (Śiva tattva). I propose asleep in the sense of its range of experiences.
the intellect (*buddhi*), ego (*ahaṃkāra*), and mind (*manas*)."\(^{129}\)

These inner organs are considered senses just as sight and touch would be considered senses. The outer organs are "'doors' (*dvāra*) or channels through which this power [consciousness] flows."\(^{130}\) They are not in themselves responsible for sensory perception; rather, they provide an avenue for the consciousness of individual, localized subjects to flow through and allow for perception. Dyczkowski claims that the senses are "the most tangible expression of the power of consciousness to know and act."\(^{131}\)

Stated more clearly, it is because we can sense, which allows us to know through action, that we can understand that consciousness has the capacity to know and act.

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**The Principles of Mental Operations**\(^{132}\)

### The Four Operations

The perception of an object (*prameya*) followed by the thought of the object that expresses the perception of the object, in the form of a proposition, is the result of four operations.\(^{133}\) The first operation is sensation. Sensation is supplied by one or more of the sense powers (*jñānendriyas*) working in conjunction. Second is the selecting, or carving of the manifold of sensations available to the subject (*puruṣa/prakṛti* complex) by way of desire. This operation of “image making” is the “imaging forth the [particular phenomenal object] with the ingredients of a *particular* group of sensations ‘desired for’ i.e., sought and selected out of a whole mass of them [sensations].”\(^{134}\)

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\(^{129}\) Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 132.

\(^{130}\) Ibid., 132.

\(^{131}\) Ibid., 132.

\(^{132}\) Chatterji, *Kashmir*. This introduction on the four operations is borrowed largely from Chatterji’s work.

\(^{133}\) For instance: I see an object (a cow) and I either think or say “This is a cow” (the proposition) of my perception of the object (the cow). A *prameya* is very similar to "*idam*.”

\(^{134}\) Chatterji, *Kashmir*, 55.
the necessary selection for this image fashioning are the responsibility of the mind
(*manas*). The selected sensations then must be fabricated into a whole image. The
sense powers, or we might say sensual powers of perception, cannot provide other than
what is available in the fragmented perceptions supplied by the *jñānendriyas*. Another
operation is needed in order to synthesize these fragmented perceptions in order that they
may form a whole image. This operation must also be responsible for focused
fabrications meaning that it must synthesize in a manner that is consistent. This
operation is the I-maker (*ahānkāra*).

The other elements necessary to fashion the particular object qua particular object
are supplied from “the memory of my personal experience of the past, stored up in myself
as a particular individual or person i.e., out of myself. There is absolutely no other source
but myself from which they can be supplied.” What this essentially means is that the
particular object becomes endowed with something, previous experiences, of the
experiencer, by being “referred to what is already [his].” In a sense, the perception of
a particular object (*prameya*) is a re-cognition of this object, or one like it, previously
perceived. If we stopped the process at this point we would still be unable to posit claims
such as “I see a cow” for we still have not accounted for how we become aware of the
distinguishing characteristics shared by perceptions that will enable us to recognize one
perception with some prior perception. In order to do this we need a “standard of
reference” that will allow us to compare perceptions with the distinguishing feature of
prior perceptions. This operation is fulfilled by *Buddhi*. *Buddhi* allows us to think and

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135 To what degree *manas* is separate from the five sense powers (*jñānendriya*-s) is questionable.
137 Ibid. , 57.
138 Ibid. , 58.
speak of "an object of perception as 'such and such a thing and not such and such a thing' - 'as a cow and not as a horse or dog.'"\(^{139}\)

**Buddhi**

The intellect (**Buddhi**) is the first manifestation of **prakṛti**, "the primordial matter [that] is understood to be a power of consciousness technically called Šāmbhavīśakti."\(^{140}\) It is an impersonal experience in the sense that there is no thought of identity of the subject, nor objects. Rather, there is "only the notion of existence- of only the fact that certain things or ideas are … it is said to be an experience of Being only (**Sattā-Mātra**)."\(^{141}\) During this phase there is only a vague feeling of presentations, much like one experiences upon immediately waking up, before the flow of thoughts proliferates.\(^{142}\)

Chatterji comments on the manifestation and nature of **Buddhi**:

*Buddhi* is the 'affection' of the *puruṣa*, as the blissful but unmoving feeling of mere presentation (**prakāśa** only), by the **prakṛti** in that affective feature (**guna**) of hers which can so effect (i.e., in her aspect as the **Sattva guṇa**), and which becomes, at the time, more prominent than her other two features or aspects, both of which are also present therein but held in comparative suppression.\(^{143}\)

In addition to its nature as a simple awareness [**prakāśa**] of existence, **Buddhi** has other contents called **saṃskāras**.\(^{144}\) Chatterji says that the **saṃskāras** are the extracted essences of our prior experiences that function as the standards of reference for judgments.\(^{145}\)

**Buddhi** is unique in that there is no ego, nor discursive thought at this point. Rather, all that there is is an apprehension of what lies within the senses. In a

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\(^{139}\) Ibid., 58.

\(^{140}\) Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 133.


\(^{142}\) This analogy of "waking up" is to be found in Chatterji, *Kashmir*.

\(^{143}\) Ibid., 66.

\(^{144}\) I would like to say that I believe the **saṃskāra-s** are meant to be seen as remains of personal experience, and past experiences that will color our perceptions, not just be used as standards of reference.

\(^{145}\) Chatterji, *Kashmir*, 67. Chatterji remarks that the **saṃskāra-s** are also called sesa chetasikā by the Buddhists. This means something like 'the last remnants or final results of mental operations.'
way, all the Buddhi does is "register" experiences making them usable for the ahaṃkāra and manas. Buddhi "illumine[s] the products of sensory and mental activity" thereby manifesting them in such a way as to make them accessible to further perception. Further perception, as I understand it, basically means a more contracted manifestation. What is present as mere existence in Buddhi, becomes an experience for me, the limited subject, in the ahaṃkāra tattva, and the object of discursive thought in manas. The flow of consciousness continues as this object becomes further objectified as an "outer other" composed, not only of the existence perceived by Buddhi, nor as simply an object to be experienced by me, nor as just the object capable of being "constructed" by mental movements (thoughts), but also as a distinct entity that is outside of me so far as consciousness flows through the senses outwards in order to create and reveal the object.

**Ahaṃkāra**

To continue with Chaterjee’s model of awakening from sleep, the I-maker (ahaṃkāra) is a manifestation from Buddhi, i.e., its realization as an Experience after that of Buddhi, may again be likened to the stage immediately following that self-oblivious Consciousness which we sometimes have on waking up from a state of sleep, which corresponds in some respects, as we have seen, to the experience of Buddhi… on waking up- in the sort of case we have taken for our example- first there is the consciousness of the surroundings, without the thought of self as the ‘I’ of the experience. Then the thought turns to oneself and there is the conscious experience, ‘I am so and so.’

Ahaṃkāra serves the purpose of identification as an individual. The contributing characteristics of this self-identity are the various experiences we have had since birth, and quite possibly before birth. This "I" is “an aggregate of these experiences and of

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146 Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 133.
their concrete results” stored somewhere within our being.\textsuperscript{148} The experiences that constitute our “I” transform our perceptions into “something more than what is actually ‘given’ by the senses.”\textsuperscript{149}

Aside from, and in conjunction with the I-making of the individual, the \textit{ahaṃkāra} functions to select elements from the \textit{Buddhi}, which here functions as a manifold ‘container’; these elements being made available by the senses, so that they [specific perceptions] can be fashioned into particular objects. In the process of selection, what is selected is made one’s own. Ownership of these fashioned perceptions leads to a sense of identity between sensed object and experience. It further gives rise to the experience of what I am, an experience of self-apperception, if you will. “The realization of one-self as the ‘I’ and as the self and owner of a ‘particular this,’ as distinguished from the ‘All-this,’ is what is meant by the production of the \textit{Ahaṃkāra}.”\textsuperscript{150} By providing a sense of ownership it may also be said that the \textit{Ahaṃkāra}’s function is one of “appropriation, or self-arrogation, or identification (\textit{Abhimāna})”\textsuperscript{151} … by engaging itself in, or intently fixing the thought on, what is so selected.”\textsuperscript{152} It is from the \textit{Ahaṃkāra} that the other senses emerge.

\textit{Manas}

The \textit{Manas} is constantly at work fashioning images from the manifold of perceptions supplied by the sense powers. Not only does the mind (\textit{manas}) fashion these various perceptions into images by attentive selection, it must also make them available to the \textit{ahamṃākra} by “hand[ing] over the sense [perceptual]-manifold after it has been

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 69. I would say stored within the \textit{Buddhi}, though this is still not absolutely clear to me.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Abhi}-: on, about and \textit{Man}-: to think or feel.
\textsuperscript{152} Chatterji, \textit{Kashmir}, 71.
transformed into images to be presently endowed with other elements by the *Ahaṃkāra* itself from its own store-house."  

Strictly speaking, *manas* is driven by desires. The desires that drive it are blind gropings for synthesis. It is because of this drive to synthesize that we even have perceptual images that can be made available to the *Ahaṃkāra* to be further fashioned, and then illumined by *Buddhi*. *Manas* is the site where "consciousness fashions specific, clearly defined mental representations of the world of sensations, which pour into the inner mental organ through the channels of the outer senses and is reflected in the intellect."  

In some ways *Manas* is like a hyper-sense power because it is really just a perceptual capacity (sense) that has the sense-power of making available synthesized perceptions, like seeing has the sense power of making available visual perceptions. Another reason why I want to say that *manas* is a hyper-sense power is because it has siblings that are also products of the *Ahaṃkāra*- The Decad of capacities, or powers (*Indriyas*) [the 5 *Buddhi*ndriyas, or *Jñānendriyas*, and the 5 *Karmendriyas*], and the quintad of general objects of the special senses (*tanmātra*-s). The ten *indriya*-s come into manifestation at the same time as the *manas*. All of these powers, including the *manas*, are developed out of specific desires to perceive or act, in a certain way. In fact, *manas*’ desire is relationally dependent upon the powers of perception and action, because *manas* always desires to act or perceive in a certain manner.

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153 Ibid., 75. This is an interesting point that likely shares connections with *Yogācāra*. It is possible that this is an idea borrowed from *Śaṅkhya*, indicating connections between *Śaṅkhya* and *Yogācāra* Buddhism.


155 Chatterji, *Kashmir*, 81

156 Ibid., 81. This desire to act or perceive in a certain way is connected with *manas*’ role as the synthesizer of perceptual input into particular images to be made available to the *Ahaṃkāra*. 
The Decad of Indriya-s and the Pentad of Tanmātra-s

When the Śaivites speak of Indriya-s they are not necessarily referring to the physical organs of sight, hearing, tasting, smelling and touch; rather, they are specifically referring to “those powers or faculties of the Puruṣa- rather the Puruṣa as endowed with and manifesting these faculties and powers – which show themselves as operating through or by these physical organs.”¹⁵⁷ The division of the Jñānendriya-s and Karmendriya-s is based primarily on the location of their physical manifestation, the sensory, and nervous system respectively.¹⁵⁸ The five Jñānendriya-s are: 1) power of hearing (Śravaṇendriya), 2) power of feeling-by touch (Sparśendriya), 3) power of seeing (Darśanendriya), 4) power of tasting (Rasanendriya), 5) power of smelling (Ghrāṇendriya). The five Karmendriya-s are: 1) power of expression (Vāgindriya), 2) power of grasping or handling (Hastendriya), 3) power of locomotion (Pādendriya), 4) power of excretion; voiding, spitting (Pāvyindriya), 5) power of sexual action (Upasthendriya).

These ten powers are expressed through their respective organs, but they are not these organs. In fact, as Chaterjee notes, the organs were fashioned in order that these powers may be expressed in the manner allowed by their respective organs, regardless of whether the organ was manifested to allow a particular type of perception [eye, ear, etc.] or action [leg, reproductive organ, etc.].¹⁵⁹

As was said earlier, there is always a dialectic at work between the subject, object and power of perception [illuminator, illuminating and illumination]. For this reason, it is no surprise that the 5 general elements of the particulars of sense perception (tanmātras)

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. , 78.
¹⁵⁸ Ibid. , 78.
¹⁵⁹ Ibid. , 80.
simultaneously arise with the ājñānendriyas. The Tanmātras are: 1) Sound-as-such (Śabda-Tanmātra), 2) Feel-as-such (Sparśa-Tanmātra), 3) Color-as-such (Rūpa-Tanmātra), 4) Flavor-as-such (Rasa-Tanmātra), 5) Odor-as-such (Gandha-Tanmātra).

Chaterjee’s remarks on simultaneous arising:

Therefore, the moment the manas arises as desire, the āhaṅkāra takes a triple form, as for instance, ‘I desire to see some color.’ In this experience the ‘i’ is the āhaṅkāra in the background; and the three forms of its manifestation are the ‘desire’ which is Manas, the Seeing which is the Indriya, (in this case of vision) and the Notion of some color which is the object of perception. The object also- the notion of some color- can be nothing else but only a form of the āhaṅkāra realized as a thing projected outside, as there is no other source from which it can come to the āhaṅkāra, and as its own perception: for anything that is any body’s own is really a part of his own Self as a person, i.e., of his āhaṅkāra.¹⁶⁰

At this stage the tanmātra-s are not given by objects and deduced through inference even though the notion of color-as-such, etc., is never experienced in the world. They are available prior to the experience of particulars objects that will be referred to with the generals of the particulars of a special sense. An experience at this stage would simply be “hearing something,” or “seeing something,” without a clear understanding of what the something is; a simple awareness of perceiving some object (idam) in some manner.¹⁶¹

Immediately following the reaction between the ājñānendriya-s and the tanmātra-s are the karmendriya-s. An example of this process is provided by Chaterjee. He writes:

There is a tendency in us that, when we hear someone speak, we often want to respond and speak back. This instinct is seen very strongly preserved in certain lower animals: in jackals, for instance, so that when a

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 82.
¹⁶¹ Glenn Wallis commented on this sentences asking if the awareness discussed here is an awareness in the sense of a general, or "as such." I believe if we understand an object as such to be a particular then no; however, if our object as such is indicative of Mohanty's object-in-general then yes.
jackal hears another cry out, he also instinctively responds and howls back.\textsuperscript{162}

The power to respond is “switched on” by the reaction between the $jñānendriya-s$ and the $tanmātra-s$ and is carried out by the $karmendriya-s$. As Chaterjee remarks; “The individual as thus endowed [with all of these powers and capacities] may be termed the ‘Soul’.”\textsuperscript{163}

**The Five Principles of Materiality ($Bhūta-s$)**

The perception of the generals of the particulars ($tanmātra-s$) of the specific senses will become non-captivating after some time. The $puruvapraṣkṛti$ complex, which is still a non-spatial point ($aṃu$),\textsuperscript{164} will gradually lose interest in the experience of the $Tanmātra-s$. The desire for experience, caused by the $manas$, seeks more experiences. The way to provide new and varied experiences is to alter the $tanmātras$, because within the general conceptions ($Tanmātras$) are “contained all the elements of the particulars.”\textsuperscript{165}

Perceptual particulars arise from the perceptual generals.

Manifestation of the $bhūta-s$ results from a sudden experience of perceptual variety in place of the “nothingness” of perceived generalities. At this point there is still no physical body, as manifestation of the physical $bhūta$ has not yet occurred. The perception of these varied perceptual particulars would feel the totality of our sensorium for there is no localization of the $jñānendriya-s$ without a physical body. This would undoubtedly be an experience of “something that goes in all directions ($diśaḥ$).”\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., 86.
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 97.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 91.
something (ākāśa) "goes out in all directions and makes all space or locale possible; or empty." This gives rise to the bhūta ether (ākāśa).

In a manner similar to the manifestation of ethereality, feeling-as-such becomes varieated to the point where there is a constant flux in temperature. These subtle feelings are indicative of movements like that of "air or the aerial atmosphere; that is, of what may be called aeriality—technically Vāyu." We then begin to vary color-as-such in order to stimulate new experiences. This gives rise to "Form and Shape (Rūpa) without which no shade of Color is ever perceived." Unlike the experience of ether as the consequence of sound, the experience of form is not the consequence of the variation of color. It is, however, identical with the experience of a particular color, which the variation of the Rūpa-Tanmātra provides. Also arising from the experience of forms is the experience of "something" which fashions these forms by producing, transforming and destroying them. "From [the] variety produced in the rūpa-tanmātra, there comes into manifestation Agni, the Form-building, (and therefore the form-destroying) Principle, or formativity." Next is the variation of flavor-as-such (Rasa-Tanmātra). This gives rises to an enveloping sense of moisture. The perceived objects of moisture or liquidity are composed of this material substance, which still lacks a physical domain. The final variation is that of odor-as-such (Gandha-Tanmātra). Chaterjee writes:

The moment such a variety was perceived there would, as in the previous cases, be realized a consequent experience which must follow the perception as necessarily as the other consequent experiences following

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167 Ibid., 93.
168 Ibid., 95.
169 Ibid., 95.
170 Ibid., 96.
171 I am not exactly sure what this "something" is but I would provisionally suggest it is connected with languaged perception. See chapter 3.
172 Chatterji, Kashmir, 97.
perceptions of varieties in Sound, Feel, Colour, and Flavour. The only experience which is absolutely necessary [though others may be perceived] and is necessarily present is simply that a something is *standing* still or *staying* or *sticking*, namely, to or at the sense of smelling—therefore standing still on, or sticking to, the whole of i.e., all over, the soul, inasmuch as the sense of smell is at this stage all over the soul— as distinguished from the consequent experiences in the previous cases which are either all-directions, i.e., Space, or movements of some sort. It is, in other words, an experience of something stable, i.e., of ‘*stability*’ which is the essential characteristic of all things solid and may therefore be also spoken of as *solidity*.  

This stability, or solidity is *Pṛthivī*. It is responsible for hardness, pressure, roughness, weight, etc.  

These are the five objects of perceptions (*Bhūta*-s): 1) Etheriality (*ākāśa*), 2) Aeriality (*Vāyu*), 3) Formativity (*Agni*), 4) Liquidity (*Ap*), 5) Solidity (*Pṛthivī*). They are given the name *Bhūta*-s because they are “What have been, or happened, or the ever ‘Have beens’, and never ‘Ares’, or the ghosts, namely of the Real.” I am not sure exactly how to take the last remark about the ghosts of reality. I can only assume that this is an unwarranted, unsaustimated definition of the *Bhūta*-s, unless we are willing and able to claim the ghosts are as real as the Real.

The vitality of life has not been discussed because it is the absolute (*caitanya*) that provides vitality as the inner source of the universe. Inherent within the 5 *Bhūta*-s are the actual possibilities of the varieties of the objects of specific perceptions [e-flat, a-flat, etc] and [sound, color, etc.]. These varieties may combine in any number of ways to produce the various objects of manifestation. This array of manifestation is collectively called “*Viṣayas*, i.e., ‘objects’ or what ‘lies variously in front’ and perceived as concomitant

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173 Ibid., 98.
174 Ibid., 98.
175 Ibid., 99.
176 Glenn Wallis reminded me that the term *Bhūta* also means ghost. There is undoubtedly a play of words. I personally enjoy that the term has the sound of "boo".
with, or which is the same thing, as inherent in, the principles of Ākāśa, Vāyu, Agni, Ap, and Prthivī, that is, of etheriality, Aeriality, Formativity, Liquidity, and Solidity.”

**Concluding Remarks**

This whole process has been shown to be caused by the movement (vimarśa) of perception (pratyakṣa). We have seen how it is that objects (idam-s) are fashioned from consciousness (caitanya). We must also remember that this system is constantly expanding and contracting. Abhinava reminds us:

The nature of the knowing subject [parama-śiva, or the puruṣa/prakṛti complex depending on the stage of manifestation] is that it is characterized by [not only] knowledge and action, [but that] its nature is one of contraction and expansion [Spanda], that is, opening and closing.

We must remember this in order to account for and understand how it is that we fashion the phenomenal world, and also reappropriate it through the process of reabsorption, by the powers of perception (jñānendriyas) (and the inherent reflexive nature of perception) that we also use to fashion our phenomenal worlds. If it is the case that AKS intends to be providing an ontological position, then it does seem that their system is consistent with a non-dual ontology. Both the universe’s manifestation and the sensorium of the individual human are constituted through perception. Whether we should take this to be an ontological claim remains to be seen, though most scholars would argue that we should read this as such. Now we will look at the phenomena of perception: its creative aspect, its fashioning aspect, and its aspect as reflexive.

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177 Ibid., 100.
178 Muller-Ortega, Heart, 209.
CHAPTER 3: PERCEPTION

“I am not and another is not, I am only powers.”
(nāhamasmi macānyo’sti kevalāḥ śaktayastvaham)
-Abhinavagupta

Now that we have had a look at the cosmology of AKS we will direct our attention to perception (Pratyakṣa). My intent in this chapter is to situate perception in an Indian context by providing some common descriptions of Indian theories of perception, and to also discuss the AKS theory of perception. My reasons for an exposition of perception are closely connected with two ideas that pertain to it: 1) the notion that one’s theory of indeterminate perception, if there is one, reveals an ontology, and 2) the idea that knowing has a transformative effect on the practitioner in the sense of allowing one to "become." A common example of point 2 is to be found in the oft cited remark, “To know Śiva is to become Śiva”. I intend to illustrate that while AKS does posit

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179 I cannot express my gratitude enough for the enlightening conversations I have had with Chris Cotton, Tzuchein Tho, Chad Weiner, and Sonam Kachru about these matters.
180 Flood, Body, titlepage.
181 I would like to remind the reader that there is not just one AKS theory of perception when it comes to details, but there are overarching themes found within the works of various AKS teachers such as Somananda, Abhinavagupta, Kṣemaraja.
182 I would like to remind the reader that I intend to investigate these claims. I feel uncomfortable with 1 because I am having trouble determining what exactly direct perception is in AKS, and if what it can be considered to be without thought constructs (nirvikalpa). See next note for more on this.
183 J.N. Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), 141. Another point that makes perception such an important concept, warranting examination, is its connections with ontology. Ibid., 20. Mohanty writes: “It should be remembered that one’s ontology is clearly reflected in one’s theory of indeterminate perception, such that whatever one perceives in this way, for example free from all conceptual intervention, must be eo ipso real.” I take this to mean that primary perception reveals what is actual. If primary perception is dualistic then it follows that reality is ontologically dualistic; if primary perception is non-dual then reality, ontologically speaking, must be non-dual also. David Loy, Nonduality, (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 1998), denies this point in some respects. He reminds us that the Saṃkhyaṇa, reputed for their strict dualistic ontology, hold non-dual perception as their goal. However, I feel his conclusion is misguided and unwarranted. It does not seem to be the case that primary perception, according to Saṃkhyaṇa, is non-dual, only that the goal is a non-dual
something like a non-dualistic \( (advaya) \) account of perception, and while there is the subtle intimation that this is the most natural, and consequently only manner in which we perceive, certain aspects of the human condition may problematize our awareness of the non-dual status of the universe. Preliminarily, I will say that the factors that may affect our epistemological orientation towards the world, and which lead to the experience of differentiation in experience, are thinking and languaging.\(^{184}\) There are methods [means \( (upāya) \)] that allow the practitioner to recognize the unity in diversity in order to reveal the non-dual \( (advaya) \) nature of the universe. The job of certain rituals, especially the ones discussed in the PTv and PTLv,\(^{185}\) provide such a method. These points will be further addressed in chapter four.

**Methodological Points of Concern\(^{186}\)**

While reading through this chapter the reader should keep in mind certain points of concern of the author. Because of limits of length and time, as well as my desire to resist digression from the topic, I have had to leave certain problems un-addressed. Additionally, for the most part I have only used Indian theories of perception, consciousness, etc. One should not expect to find Kant’s theory of perception, nor

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\(^{184}\) The extent to which language and thinking are related will be examined at a later point.

\(^{185}\) PTLv refers to the Paratrśīkā-Laghuvṛtti. PTv refers to the Parātrśīkā-vivarana. Abhinava wrote the short manual Parātrśīkā and then provided two commentaries on it. The PTLv is the shorter commentary. It can be found in Muller-Ortega, *Heart*; the longer commentary is the focus of Bäumer’s, *Parātrśīkā*.

\(^{186}\) We should note that this project is somehow doomed before it starts because of my attempt to use language to discuss something like non-dual perception. Loy, *Nonduality*, is right, I think, when he says that all such a work (like mine) can hope for is a savikalpa description of a nirvikalpa reality. However, we must also remember the Zen maxim, “About this nothing can be said, but you must say something.” So this chapter, much like Chapter two, asks that the reader realize certain limitations and conditions are necessary for us to conceptualize the following ideas, but ideally should be dispensed with in return for the experience of such, i.e., non-dual perception.
Searle’s theory of consciousness. This is not to say that I think comparative philosophy is somehow misguided; in fact, I believe there is undoubtedly a need for such work. However, at this point I am simply not capable of doing such in any kind of cohesive intelligible manner. Glaring points of comparative interest and sources that may be useful to refer to will be included in footnotes.

Another point that should be noted is the fluidity of the term perception (**pratykaśa**). As will be seen shortly, we commonly find the term perception (**pratykaśa**) being used to denote a variety of concepts. Indeed, it may be the case that many supposed differences between perceptual theories are simply the result of the term perception (**pratykaśa**) being used to denote a different concept altogether. I will generally be referring to perception (**pratyakṣa**) as AKS understands it unless I note otherwise.

Lastly, chapter two was presented as a template to be used to enrich the reading of this section, much like this section will enrich and strengthen the work in chapter four. Please use it accordingly.

**Perceptions Place and Role in The Darśana-s**

The term **darśana** is commonly used to denote religio/philosophical systems in India. The term comes from the root **drś**, which means “to see”; therefore, **Darśana** means something like a "view," or a "seeing." What I find particularly interesting about this term is its undeniable intimation of perception. Though **darśana** appears limited to a visual perception, that is a “seeing” in the normal sense of the word, there seems to be a subtle enveloping of all sensory perception, including that of the mind. It is not

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187 In fact, I personally believe that it works much better as a denotation of the various Indian systems than does Philosophy or Religion.
uncommon to use "see" in this manner. If we choose to render darśana in this way, it follows that it is something like a worldview that is simultaneously derived from and colors our experience.

One philosophical aspect that is universally accepted among the Darśanas is perception (pratyakṣa). It is universally accepted as a valid means of acquiring true cognitions (pramāṇa); even the Carvakins accept the validity of perception. In fact, in South Asia perception is generally accorded primacy in the process of knowledge. Mohanty points out that all subsequent modes of knowledge (pramāṇa); scripture, inference testimony, etc., depend upon perception. For instance, the scripture the rṣis revealed was perceived by them, even if through some sort of supersensory perceptual process, prior to their recounting what they heard. As for inference, a current perception is necessary in order to begin the inference that will follow the formerly perceived cognition.

Certain points should be kept in mind when discussing perception in an Indian context. Within the Darśanas, perception (pratyakṣa) is not exactly "synonymous with

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188 For instance, when I am playing a musical note and I am trying to teach it to someone, I might perform it, and then say "See?," asking if they understand how I produced it.
189 In conversation Glenn Wallis has wondered if the "worldview" I have spoken of is synonymous with the Buddhist notion of dṛṣṭi (view, or opinion) which is commonly used by the Buddhist in a negative sense. I believe that my understanding of darśana as a "worldview" is very similar to dṛṣṭi, but I would argue that this should not be seen in a negative manner for two reasons. Firstly, according to my reading of AKS we cannot move beyond our "worldview" in the strictest sense. We are always fashioning and being fashioned. However, this does not prohibit insight into an unfashioned "worldview" which I would argue reveals the primary nature of the "all" as fashionable. The "all" here includes the agent as well as objects and means of perception. Secondly, because of the status of perception as inherently savikalpa, that is inherently fashioning, I would argue that the notion of fashioned view (Wallis' view, or opinion) is not some type of deluded account. In fact, any opinion is both equally true and equally false. It is equally true because it is a perceived account, and equally false because it is an interpretation of the fashionable nature of reality. It is Fashionableness of the all that allows any "worldview" to be both true and false.
190 For this reason, I believe that all of the Indian Daśana-s would be Phenomenologically grounded.
191 Mohanty, Classical, 16-17. According to Mohanty, Perception is the one pramāṇa that all Indian Darsanas, even the Carvakins, held to be a valid means of knowledge. However, there seems to be some discrepancy over whether or not the Carvakins considered the mental sense to be capable of perceptions.
192 Inference will be discussed in section 3.4.c: AKS as a Realistic Idealism.
'experience', nor [is] 'inference' [synonymous] with 'reason'. Mohanty makes this remark in order to illustrate that the Darśanas never had a clear distinction concerning the question of the "valid means of knowledge," such as the Western dichotomy between the rationalist and the empiricist. Mohanty again:

Those who recognized perception as a means of knowing (in fact, every philosophical school did so) often did not restrict perception to sensory perception, and did not restrict sensory perception to the domain of sensible qualities such as colour and material objects such as sticks and stones. Amongst things that were to be taken to be sensuously perceived are: the self and its qualities such as pleasure, pain, desire, and cognition; universals such as redness; natural-kind essences such as cowness; and relations such as contact and inherence ... That inference is different from reason (of the rationalists) is clear from the very etymology of the word anumāna; it follows upon perception. There is always a priority of perception. There are no Indian rationalists. Neither perception nor inference pointed to any specific faculty of mind ...

It is important to realize that perception is simply a means of cognition (pramāna), and that a means of cognition (pramāna) is more or less the "cause of, or the specific means of acquiring, an irreducible type of pramā or true cognition." It is obvious that perception (pratyakṣa) is accorded primacy and priority in AKS for the simple reason that illumination (prakāśa) is just a perception (pratyakṣa) that is immediately available to awareness (caitanya). What this means is that all experience, as well as the totality of manifestation, is dependent upon perception (pratyakṣa) as illuminative. This places perception (pratyakṣa) at the fore of the possibility, and actuality, of all true cognitions (pramā). Lawrence writes: "Abhinava follows both Bhartrihari and Vatsyayana in stating that scripture and direct perception can sublate

193 Mohanty, Reason, 228.
194 Mohanty, Reason, 228.
195 Ibid., 228.
196 Every true cognition (pramā) is a re-cognition (vimarśa) because of the inherent bi-nature of awareness (caitanya): illuminative (prakāśa) and reflexive (vimarśa).
inference." He then offers another passage that seems counter-intuitive to what we have already heard about perception. He writes: "He [Abhinava] also states that more can be known about the categories of reality (tattva) from scripture (Āgama), which has as its ultimate nature the recognitive judgment [vimāraśa] of the Great Lord, than from direct perception [pratyakṣa] and inference [anumāna]." My sense is that this seeming contradiction can be overcome by realizing that ultimately the tattva-s are merely conventioned languaged constructs that are supplied by scripture in order to provide a map of fashioning, to be used by perception, which perception (pratyakṣa) would not be privileged without such information.

**Various Accounts of Perception**

**Various Accounts**

Dignāga, the reputed Buddhist logician, remarked that “perception is a cognition which is free from any concept”, i.e., thought constructs (vikalpa). Later Buddhists would claim that perception is not erroneous because it is a simple perceiving; as Mohanty says, a “pure sensation” of what is. At the other extreme, the Advaita Vedantins reserved the term pratyakṣa for denotation of perception that is constructed with (by?) thought constructs (savikalpa pratyakṣa). What Dignāga referred to as perception (pratyakṣa), the Advaita Vedāntins would categorize as non-perception; what the Advaita Vedāntins classified as perception would be considered as imaginative

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198 Ibid., 219 fn #1.
200 Glenn Wallis has raised the issue of whether or not "pure sensation" would be prior to perception in early Buddhism. My initial response would be yes; however, I wonder whether the "pure sensation" itself is not perception.
conceptual constructs by the Buddhists. These two forms of perception (*pratyakṣa*), i.e.,
that without thought constructs (the Buddhist’s) and that with thought construct (the
Advaita Vedāntin) are commonly referred to as *nirvikalpa* and *savikalpa pratyakṣa*,
respectively. For the Buddhist, only *nirvikalpa* perception is denoted by the term
*pratyakṣa*; for the Advaita Vedantin only *Savikalpa* perception is denoted by the term
(*pratyakṣa*).

While the concept denoted by the term perception (*pratyakṣa*) is different
between these schools, both systems recognized that there where forms of perception
other than what they recognized as being denoted by the term *Pratyakṣa*; however, they
would not refer to these other forms of perception as *pratyakṣa*. The majority of the
other *Darśanas*, excluding, perhaps, the Carvakins, recognized two forms of *pratyakṣa*;
*Nirvikalpa* and *Savikalpa*. Actually, it may be more correct to say that the other
*Darśanas* recognized that there are two ways of interacting with perception; either with
thought construct (*savikalpa*), or without (*Nirvikalpa*). As we will see later in this work,
the AKS added an additional spin to the definition of perception by claiming “perception
is merely the illumination of manifestation.” This reveals something creative about the
nature of perception in the AKS system.

**The Grammarians vs. The Yogācārins: The Role of Language as
Constitutive of Perception vs. Perception Independent of Language**

Attempting to account for perception is a sordid affair. Now, when I refer to
perception I am referring to the contact between a sense organ[s] and the object of
sensation. What this contact entails and how it occurs will differ from school to school,
as will the definition of the sense organ[s] and what it means for something to be an
object of sensation. Two ways of discussing the phenomena of perception are: as intimately connected and constructed through language (*Bhartrhari*), or as simply a passive absorption of the effects of the aforementioned contact between sense organ[s] and object of sensation (*Yogacarin Buddhist*).

In the linguistic camp, *Bhartrhari* proposed that "There is no awareness in this world without its being intertwined with the word." For *Bhartrhari*, language is the ground of knowledge. He writes:

If there were to end the eternal condition of cognition having the nature of speech, awareness could not be aware. For it is this [condition that cognition has the nature of speech] which makes possible recognitive judgment [*pratyavamarśini*]. This [condition] secures [*upabhandidri*] all the branches of learning, the crafts and the arts. Due to it, everything created is classified.

And from Abhinava we have remarks on some points made by *Bhartrhari* about the role of speech in cognition. He writes:

It has also been said by the honorable *Bhartrhari*: "There is no cognition in the world which is without the accompaniment of speech. Every cognition is experienced as if permeated by speech... It [speech] is the consciousness of all beings subject to transmigratory existence, and it exists both internally and externally. If there were an end to that [speech], [one] would be observed to be unconscious, like wood or a wall."

It seems, based on these remarks, it is impossible to move beyond languaged experience into a realm of direct perception of discrete phenomenal happenings.

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201 Interestingly enough, it does not seem to follow that the perceptual theory of *Bhartrhari* is inconsistent with a non-dualistic ontology, even though he asserts that all perception is *savikalpa*. But in fact, all his claim does is reify the position that perception is interconnected with thought constructs and language which, as far as I can tell, in no way contradicts a non-dual ontology. In fact, I would argue that the Advaita Vedāntin process of negation inevitably places one into a dualistic ontology because there is always the unreal, as opposed to the real. This is connected with my earlier refusal to endorse Mohanty's theory that ontology is revealed in direct perception qua non-dual perception, and is similarly tied with my dissatisfaction with the status of the object.


204 Ibid., 116.
In direct opposition, the Yogācārins claimed that perception is a cognition "which is caused by its object."²⁰⁵ Some years after Vasubhandu made this remark, Dignāga, the Yogācārin logician, claimed that,

Freed from all that can be named, true perception or perhaps, pure sensation, one may want to say... presents only the bare particular which is 'its own nature' (svalakṣana) and which is radically different from that which possesses a nature common to many (sāmānyalakṣana).²⁰⁶

Beyond the direct perception of svalakṣana,²⁰⁷ the Buddhists also admit conceptual constructions [vikalpa]. These conceptual constructs are responsible for imagined universals that may be attributed to the "point instances" (svalakṣana), because in themselves the svalakṣana are so unique that they are indistinguishable. Coat-tailing the Grammarians, the Yoāgacārin Buddhists base conceptual construction in language that a fortiori indict language as a co-conspirator in the proliferation of imaginative phenomenal construction. For them, language creates an illusion, while for the Grammarians language is constitutive of experience in its most basic and real sense.

Other Options

We generally run across two types of perception that are inevitably dependent upon the ontological position a system holds. There is a dualistic account of perception in which the subject actually perceives an object as independent from them, and there is a non-dualistic account in which the subject does not necessarily perceive the object as being separate from itself. Some systems hold that perception is always dualistic (dvaya), some hold that it is always non-dualistic (advaya), and some maintain that it is both dualistic (dvaya), as well as non-dualistic depending upon certain influencing

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 239.
²⁰⁷ Lawrence has translated svalakṣana as "unique particular", or "point instance"
factors.\textsuperscript{208} Many of the systems that try to account for two types of perception, one
dualistic, the other non-dualistic, generally accord primacy to non-dual perception, while
claiming dualistic perception is the result of thought constructs (\textit{vikalpa}) that occur after
the initial moment of perception and are superimposed upon the bare perceptual
experient. This type of primary, foundational perception is what may generally be
termed \textit{nirvikalpa pratyakṣa}, or perception without qualification. It is purely and simply
a seeing, not a seeing as, but merely sensing things as they are revealed. \textit{Savikalpa}
\textit{pratyakṣa}, or perception with qualification tends to be dualistic and is considered by
many of the \textit{Darśanas} that assert themselves as non-dualistic (\textit{advaya}) to be part of the
problem to be overcome in order to achieve liberation. In these systems, realizing reality,
seeing in the proper way, is synonymous with the occurrence of liberation. These types
of perceptions are experiences of objects "\textit{as}".\textsuperscript{209}

There is a third manner in which we discuss the relation of ontology and
perceptual availability in which one sees non-duality in duality. Here there would be a
non-dualistic ontology where perception is always \textit{savikalpa} to some degree, and the
status of ontology as non-dualistic would be available through dualistic perception. This
is the general position of the Grammarians, and I would also argue of AKS. AKS don't
seem to see liberation (\textit{mukti}) as being dependent upon a transcendence of \textit{savikalpa}
experiencing. Rather, they appear to be more interested in paying close attention to the

\textsuperscript{208} The best example I can think of is the three-world (\textit{Trikāya}) view found in later Mahayana Buddhism.
The idea is that there is a middleworld, which is the way things are; this is the world we always inhabit.
However, there are two other worlds- one lower and one higher. We move from one world to the other as
the way we see the world shifts. So in this sense there is less of an ontological transformation in an
awakened person; instead, what is primarily transformed is the person's epistemological orientation towards
the world.

\textsuperscript{209} An object "\textit{as}" is a determined object, not to be confused with object-in-general.
details of experience in order to recognize the non-dual nature of the dualistic world of differentiated manifestations.  

AKS Account of Perception

Components of AKS Theory of Perception

A few things should be said about the AKS notion of perception. Firstly, as I said in Chapter two, according to AKS perception (pratyakṣa) is illumination (prakāśa), this being an "aspect" of consciousness (caitanya): it illuminates. Secondly, awareness (prakāśa), which is used interchangeably with consciousness, is a way to talk about what it is perception (illumination) does when it illuminates. Thirdly, consciousness (caitanya) has another "aspect:" vimarśa. Dyczkowski, speaking from the Spanda tradition, translates vimarśa as "reflexive awareness," and Lawrence, speaking from the Pratyabhijñā, translates it as "recognitive judgment." Both translations indicate the nature of vimarśa as a returning, or bending back. Activity is obvious and the direction of this activity seems to be backwards towards its point of origin indicating a prior movement away from its point of origin. Lawrence focuses heavily on vimarśa as

210 See section 3.4.c, d, and e for further discussion about this complicated aspect of unity and multiplicity and realistic Idealism.
211 We could also interchange the terms illuminate and manifest in all instances; illumination is manifestation.
212 Glenn Wallis' desire for a clearer explanation of vimarśa has helped me to understand the difficulty in describing this term. Simply put, though possibly somewhat lacking, vimarśa is a clarification of effulgence, or "revealing" that is consciousness (caitanya). Because there is nothing but effulgence, the out of the shining out is a shining into shining. It is a making known what is already known. It is only reflexive in the sense that whatever is being "shined" (known) is already shined, and is simultaneously shining. It is like a spherical room of mirrors that are constantly making known (shining) to each other what is already known (shining).
213 This is Spanda. I read the tradition as saying that this "movement" is available in perception; that is to say, we can have an experience of the "bending backwards" of awareness.
recognitive judgment in order to illustrate the idea that each act of perception is necessarily recognition in the literal sense of a re-cognizing.

The recognitive aspect (vimarśa) of consciousness (caitanya) is also instrumental because it gives a gestalt-like flow to experience. Without its reflexive aspect (vimarśa) perception would be fragmented, and it would be impossible to amplify perceptions; there would be no synthesis of experience. In AKS perception (pratyakṣa) is reflexive; all perceptions are constantly "fed" back into awareness (caitanya). This serves the purpose of making these cognitions/perceptions available to be synthesized with present, or future, perceptions. In this way perceptions are available to awareness in a continuous, flowing manner allowing experience to escape fragmentation. The role of vimarśa will be examined further in the section on Grammarian influences.

In the PTLv Abhinava reminds us that the supreme (Paramaśīva/ Bhairava) is the "conscious percever with respect to the insentient, the inert;" and simultaneously that "the percever whose nature is consciousness and which is self-illuminating is not in turn perceived by another subject." It is the creative, dynamic aspect (vimarśa) of the ultimate (anuttara; Bhairava) that is responsible for the "group' (kula), the entire range of perceiving subject, perceived object and process of perception." This final point is crucial to understand, that the nature of subject, object and means of perception are all processes attributable to the nature of Paramaśīva (Bhairava): prakāśa is the illumination, and vimarśa is the movement along the "pole" of subject-object dichotomy. Nothing external is needed; all three facets of the phenomena of perception are necessary and intrinsic to the ultimate, as the ultimate has the bi-nature of illumination and activity.

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214 It is our epistemological orientation that accounts for the experience of "the insentient, or inert."
215 Muller-Ortega, Heart, 205.
216 Ibid., 207.
To perceive is simply another way to talk about what it is consciousness does as it 'bends back' to illuminate itself (the result of its reflective, or recognitive nature).

In his PTLv, Abhinava states that "perception here is just the illumination of the objective world, which, by nature, is divided up into two groups, namely, the knowing subjects and knowable objects." Accordingly, it makes more sense to refer to the ultimate not as the supreme experiencer as is done in the commentary to sloka 1 of the PTLv; rather, a more fitting appellation would be the perceiving, as this seems to encompass the process, instead of focusing emphasis upon one end of the spectrum of the perceptive process. At any rate, we should realize that the whole process of perception takes place in one field (kṣetra), and that the field of perception is constituted purely of consciousness (caitanya). Reflexivity (vimarśa) is responsible for the appearing of breaks in this process, which cause the apparent differentiation of aham and idam, by the continuous emission (spanda) that contracts and expands consciousness (caitanya). The subject, object and means of perception are never, I repeat never, distinct separate actualizations of consciousness. Like waves on an ocean, elements of the manifest world of apparent objects, i.e., the world as we commonly experience it, in reality, are nothing more than waves of manifestations in the sea of consciousness. Similarly, mention of a subject distinct from an object to be perceived is an incorrect account of the phenomena of perception. This is the theory commonly expounded by Advaita Vedāntins. With no object to be perceived they are left with the problematic conclusion of a perception that does not perceive. This is essentially a non-perception account of perception. I find this theory unacceptable, as I do not see how the appearance of the manifest world can be

217 Ibid., 209.
accounted for if we posit a passive point of origin, even if we are to assert, as the Advaita Vedantins would, that the manifest realm is only one realm of experience.

Perception ($pratyakṣa$) is the very process of making objects manifest: it is creative. Abhinava states: "Thus, perception ($pratīti$) alone is the creatrix and sustainer identified with Śiva. From it are born all beings, in it they are grounded." The act of perceiving is the activity of consciousness ($caitanya$) driven by reflexivity ($vimara$). $Śakti$ is none other than the intrinsic nature of consciousness to use its $prakāśa$ to perceive (illuminate); that is, to use its illumination to make manifest. But what is made manifest is not other than illumination. Rather than assuming that various manifest objects are composed of different substances, we must remember that the substratum of all manifestation is consciousness ($caitanya$), so what appears as a manifested object is simply a varied form of consciousness ($caitanya$). Exactly what creates these various forms is a matter of the manas, for it is here that $Śakti$ fulfills its role as the manifester by way of languaging, whether this languaging is external (naming) or internal (though structured in language). This process of perceiving objects, the result of thinking structured in language, proceeds because consciousness is "Full of the vibration of its own energy engaged in the act of perception, it manifests itself externally as its own object. When the act of perception is over, consciousness reabsorbs the object and turns in on itself to resume its undifferentiated nature." "Matter and the entire universe are absolutely real, as 'congealed' ($styāna$) or 'contracted' ($saṃkucita$) forms of consciousness."
This idea that the "all" is essentially grounded and composed of one "substance" that exhibits different characteristics depending upon its level of crystallization is not that uncommon, considering that we commonly assume that matter is simply extremely contracted energy. This substance, consciousness, remains unaffected through the process of contraction and expansion, as it is the nature of consciousness (caitanya) to constantly expand and contract (spanda). To use the sea metaphor again, the waves in no way affect that the sea is composed of water. I think that to carry these remarks to their logical ends would result in ontological consequences. All of the universe, even that which appears the most inert and insentient, is conscious. This point is important, and also problematic, but the scope of this Thesis does not provide space for a thorough discussion.\footnote{222}

The last and perhaps most important point to remember is that perception (pratyakṣa) is directly available to consciousness (caitanya); perception (pratyakṣa) does not require another perception to illuminate it because it is illumination (prakāśa). Whatever is perceived is consequently available as knowledge (pramā). This is only possible because of the nature of consciousness (caitanya); this nature being consciousness' inherent perceptiveness. Lawrence remarks on the self-luminosity of perception: "[it is] a self-aware subjectivity that epistemically grounds every cognition, so that one 'knows that one knows'."\footnote{223}

\footnote{222} The notion of ontological status has not been heavily addressed in this Thesis because I am still not certain in what sense we are to understand manifestation. It may be the case that Abhinava intends manifestation to be ontological, or merely to be understood as phenomenal.  
\footnote{223} Lawrence, \textit{Rediscovering}, 110.
The Consciously Constituted Object

In our everyday lives we commonly perceive "being" all around us and we take this to be an indication of the static nature of objects. The AKS are quick to point out that all manifestation is constantly and perpetually in a state of becoming, a movement from one state to another, all a result of the inner vibration of consciousness (spanda).

Lawrence offers a quote from Abhinava about becoming:

Being is the condition of one who becomes, that is, the agency of the act of becoming... Being is the agency of the act of becoming, that is, the freedom characteristic of an agent regarding all actions.

I would like to say, provisionally, that I am not sure in what sense we should take "object." There are two ways we can understand the use of what becomes translated as object: 1) object in a phenomenal sense, or 2) phenomenal object as ontological object. The status of object as phenomenal object as ontological object would mean that there is no bracketing [epoche] of the ontological status of the object, it is available in perception and can be known. The status of object as simply phenomenal object would mean that concerns about the ontological status of the object have been bracketed, perhaps in a Husserlian manner. Most scholars tend to argue for "object," as it is found in AKS, in one of these two senses. However, I have yet to be convinced that Abhinava, or any AKS master for that matter, is clearly speaking of object in any particular sense. I believe that the AKS had a sense of "object." but I have yet to be convinced by any scholar as to which sense they mean. I would speculatively say, for now at least, that when they refer to "object" it is in the sense of phenomenal object as ontological object. Therefore, I will be making small remarks throughout the rest of the Thesis concerning ontology.

Lawrence, Rediscovering, 133. For some interesting remarks on how it is that the "object" (idam) may influence and fashion the "I" (aham), see Jean Baudrillard, "The System of Objects" in Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Micheal Ryan. Revised ed. (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) 408-420. I wouldn't entirely endorse Baudrillard's position as I understand it; however, I think it is quite interesting to see how, if we understand the object as phenomenal object, then his position on how objects fashion people will help to give an interesting understand of the dialectical "Spandic" process. I say this because if we want to claim that subject and object are just the extreme poles of the movement of perception then we need to account for not only how the object is manifested from our perception, the "I"s (Baudrillard's person), but also how the object "manifests" us as it is also in some sense perceiving because it is constituted of perceptivity. Otherwise we risk falling prey to an extreme idealism were the "I" creates the outer world through perception, but is not affected by the world of perceived objects. This will help us account for how objects can "exist" independent of an "I" (aham) perceiving them- they are perception themselves, therefore as they perceive they must be equally fashioning and manifesting as the "I" is. Additionally, one should see Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology, 30-32. Lusthaus writes:

...Merleau-Ponty reminds us that the perceptual field also embodies intentionalities [objects of the field "shine" also]. Thus, it is not simply that we, as transcendental subjects, or even lived-bodies always initiate intentionality and hence acts of cognition. The perceptual field also intends toward us. As we reach towards it, it also reaching towards us. I condition my world as it is conditioning me. [italics mine] Intentionality is, then, not a unilinear act projected outwards that bounces back and reflects into the form of the noema [meaningful object constituted by intentional consciousness]. Intentionality circulates in a circuit that flows from the world into me, from me into the world, and back again and again. My subjectivity is a cognitive location in an intentional circuit, its center to be sure, but not its only source.... What is of import for our study is not how momentarily Merleau-Ponty will demonstrate that these and other seeming constants [properties] are not constant at all, but rather the necessary and radical move of bracketing the object as such
To 'be' is impossible because all manifested objects, manifestation being the sole qualification for an object to be considered real, are 'becoming'; to be manifest is to rest in the dynamic action (*spanda*) of consciousness (*caitanya*). For something to simply be, is the same as for it to cease its appearing; cessation of appearing is similarly the point that something has ceased to exist, and necessarily ceases to be real. In this manner even thoughts are real as they are manifestations perceived by the mental sense.

As far as the appearance of phenomena is concerned, an entity is determined by its form. Abhinava writes that "this is the supreme doctrine (*upaniṣad*), namely that, whenever and in whatever form [an entity] appears, that then is its particular nature." Language and thought structured in language seem to be the culprits, for ultimately all self-natures are dissolved into the self-nature of consciousness. Paradoxically, the self-nature of consciousness is that it is full (*pūrṇa*), a totality of all possibility. Therefore, I believe that we can best make sense of this idea of appearing form as self-nature as a result and a description, of the process of thought structured in language. Dyczkowski discussing Kṣemarāja on this point:

Kṣemarāja sees this process as the development of Mātrkā, the Goddess who contains the fifty energies symbolized by the letters of the Sanskrit

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226 See Dyczkowski, *Vibration*, 208. He writes: "the nature of the absolute, and also that of being, is conceived as an eternal becoming (*satatodita*), a dynamic flux or spanda, 'the agency of the act of being'." See Lusthaus, Yogacara, *From the Web*. He remarks that in Yogācāra the notion to be overturned was that of some permanent unchanging substratum (*atmān*). I believe here that notion is also overturned in exchange for a substratum that is constantly in flux.

227 Ibid., 54.

228 Ibid., 52.
alphabet that, by their development, generate the universe of words and that which they denote.\textsuperscript{229}

This passage clearly indicts language, in some manner, as the foundation and creator of objects (\textit{idam}).\textsuperscript{230} For example, as the tree is manifested in my field of perception, it becomes manifest through and as a result of my thoughts, which are structured in the language I have concerning it. So essentially, I see the tree into my perception; and in this way the nature of the tree is as I create it in my field of perception. In this way, as Abhinava says, the form that appears is truly the nature of the perceived object.

Ultimately, the nature of all phenomena is manifestation, the direct result of the bi-nature of consciousness.

It seems that the result of this idea is that ontologically the consciously constituted phenomenal object, with a nature created through languaged thought, is ultimately devoid of this particular nature. The substance that becomes conceptually fashioned into the manifest object is of the same nature as any other manifested object. In this way the bare substance of the perceived object [consciousness] truly is full in that any qualifier may apply to it, as it may be conceptually fashioned into any number of forms.

Dyczkowski remarks about appearance:

\begin{quote}
Appearance in this sense represents the actualization of a potential hidden in consciousness made possible by virtue of its dynamic, \textit{Spanda} nature. The \textit{Spanda} nature is both the flow from inner to outer and back as well as the power that impels it. The emergence from, and the submergence into, pure consciousness of each individual appearance is a particular pulsation (\textit{Viśeṣaspanda}) of differentiated awareness. Together these individual pulsations constitute the universal pulse (\textit{sāmānyaspanda}) of cosmic creation and destruction.\textsuperscript{231}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{229} Dyczkowski, \textit{Aphorisms}, 71.
\textsuperscript{230} In what sense language is responsible is questionable. Perhaps it is because perception is inherently linguistically "saturated" that it follows that language creates objects (\textit{idam-s}).
\textsuperscript{231} Dyczkowski, \textit{Vibration}, 57.
AKS as Realistic Idealism

Dyczkowski names the AKS a realistic idealistic school. Now, by all means, this title seems problematic, if not only for the paradox to be found within a realistic idealism. However, upon further analysis I believe we may find that once again, it is the paradoxical claim that ends up making the most sense. Starkly opposing realism, AKS is consistent in its claims that "Consciousness is both the substratum and what it supports: the perceiving awareness and its object." The object is not dismissed as an illusion in the sense that it is in Advaita Vedanta, but neither is it affirmed in the manner that most "realist" schools would have done.

The object is a form of awareness (vijñānākāra). The objective status of the object is cognition itself. Perception manifests its object and renders it immediately apparent (sphuta) to those who perceive it. It does not appear at any other time.... An entity becomes an object of knowledge not by virtue of the entity itself but by our knowledge of it.

Lawrence takes the prakāśa argument, which states that all manifestation is an illumination by consciousness via perception (perception being the act of consciousness) of objects to be a proof for the consciously constituted phenomenal nature of these objects. The catch is that the objects perceived are of the same nature as the consciousness that becomes conscious of them through perception. Roughly speaking, the "subjective awareness integral to every cognition constitutes the objects of these cognitions."

Utpala writes:

If the object did not have the nature of awareness [prakāśa], it would be without illumination [aprakāśa], as it was before [its appearance].

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232 Ibid. , 48.
233 Ibid. , 48-49.
234 Lawrence, Rediscovering, 110.
235 Ibid. , 110.
Awareness \textit{[prakāśa]} cannot be different [than the object]. Awareness \textit{[prakāśata]} is the essential nature of the object.\textsuperscript{236}

Dyczkowski remarking on the connection between the Śaiva view and that of the Yogācārin Buddhist:

Adopting the Buddhist Yogācāra doctrine that things necessarily perceived together are the same (\textit{sahopalambhaniyamāvāda}), the Śaivite affirms that because the perceived is never found apart from perception, they are in fact identical.\textsuperscript{237}

This form of argumentation is loosely based on the notion that we can only "be aware of that of which we are aware."\textsuperscript{238} What this means is that we cannot verify that entities exist beyond, or outside of our awareness because to do so would require that we were aware of them without being aware. As Dyczkowski says, "to verify it [the existence of objects external to awareness] we would have to know an object without perceiving it."\textsuperscript{239}

This leads one to question how the AKS account for differences in manifestation. The logical claim is that we can infer objects outside of our awareness that account for differences observed in our awareness. But this claim is not without problem. It was commonly believed that "inference of a relationship between a cause and an effect depends upon the observation of their invariable succession in a series of direct perceptions."\textsuperscript{240} The problem is that we have never had a direct perception of something outside of our awareness and therefore we lack the experiential component of this portion of the inference that is necessary in order for the inference to be carried out soundly.

\textsuperscript{236} Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{237} Dyczkowski, \textit{Vibration}, 49. In conversation with Sonam Kachru I was reminded that Dharmakirti used the cognition of "blue [pot]" to drive home the notion of indissociability (sahopala). Sonam recounts the argument as follows: When one perceives "blue [pot]" there is usually the notion that the locus of blue is the pot. This is the realist position. Dharmakirti argues that more fundamentally, the locus of both blue and pot is awareness; i.e., the locus is always awareness.
\textsuperscript{238} Lawrence, \textit{Rediscovering}, 110.
\textsuperscript{239} Dyczkowski, \textit{Vibration}, 48.
\textsuperscript{240} Lawrence, \textit{Rediscovering}, 111.
Abhinava responds to the inferential proof of objects existing externally by showing that "any means of cognition [pramāṇa] which is adduced to prove that there is an external object, on the contrary, only proves its non-externality"\textsuperscript{241} by showing perception is primary.

We have seen that it is the inherent unified nature of all manifestation (the all), which is comprised of consciousness (caitanya), that accounts for the label of Idealism, but the AKS also has elements of a realist metaphysical system. "The realist [generally] maintains that the content perceived is independent of the act of perception."\textsuperscript{242} In this way, AKS is not realist, but unabashedly idealistic.\textsuperscript{243} What functions as the defining feature of AKS as a realist system is that there is no denial of the reality of the object: "Consciousness and its contents are essentially identical and real."\textsuperscript{244} The qualification of realism also issues from the fact that "appearance (ābhāsa) alone is real."\textsuperscript{245} This claim is a result of the dynamic nature of the supreme, for "the nature of the absolute, and also that of being, is conceived as an eternal becoming (satatodita), a dynamic flux or spanda, 'the agency of the act of being'."\textsuperscript{246} "Everything is real according to the manner in which it appears."\textsuperscript{247} This means that appearances, or manifestations are real in the sense that there is never an unmanifest; everything is available to us just as it is, and just as we perceive it. These remarks were offered in response to those systems that placed a heavy emphasis upon the role of illusion (māyā),\textsuperscript{248} claiming that the manifest world is

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid., 111.
\textsuperscript{242} Dyczkowski, \textit{Vibration}, 48.
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{248} Systems such as the Advaita Vedānta of Sankaracarya.
somehow unreal and superseded by a real unmanifest that is hidden. Here is Dyzckowski again on the reason for qualifying AKS as realist:

The reality of the world demands recognition; we are forced to accept the direct presentation of the fact of our daily experience. As Abhinava says: 'if practical life, which is useful to all persons at all times, places and conditions were not real, then there would be nothing left which could be said to be real.'249

**Healing the Paradox Between the Reality of Appearance and Transcendence into the Nature of Phenomena as Constituted by Consciousness**

As the last section said, because of the recognition the reality of the world demands, it is imperative that we "accept the direct presentation of the fact of our daily lives."250 We cannot make things appear other than they do. This poses a problem if we are going to take seriously the claim that realization, which allows liberation (mukti), is marked by the realization of the Śiva nature of the all. To work our way through this problem we can recognize that there are various levels of consciousness,251 not various levels of experience.

The manifestation of an entity in its own specific form is a fact at one level of consciousness; it is real. The appearing of the same entity in the same form but recognized to be a direct representation of the absolute is also a fact, but at another level of consciousness. It is no more or less real than the first. 'As is the state of consciousness, so is the experience,' says Abhinava.252

We should not mistake these remarks to mean that the nature of the absolute, apparent through higher levels of consciousness, is absent in specific forms. In fact, the nature of the absolute, and a fortiori of all objective entities, "presents itself to us directly in the

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250 Ibid., 53.
251 Perhaps the way to take this remark is rather in terms of various levels of cognition.
specific form in which we perceive things; otherwise there would be no way in which we could penetrate from the level of appearing to that of its source and basis.\textsuperscript{253} Abhinava remarks:

Real is the entity (\textit{vastu}) that appears in the moment of direct perception (\textit{sāksātkāra}), that is to say, within our experience of it. Once its own specific form has been clearly determined one should, with effort, induce it to penetrate into its pure conscious nature.\textsuperscript{254}

In Husserlian fashion Dyczkowski says, "Liberating knowledge is gained not by going beyond appearances but by attending closely to them."\textsuperscript{255} There is no ontological distinction "between the absolute and its manifestations because both are an appearing (\textit{ābhāśa}), the latter of diversity and the former of the true light of consciousness which is beyond \textit{māyā} and is the category Śiva'.\textsuperscript{256} It seems that what changes in liberation is the way that we interact with the world. Objects and experience do not change in any ontological manner, but instead our orientation and the way we interpret our experiences change.

**AKS Perception in Light of Buddhist and Grammarian Theories**

Close connections are made between the recognitive (\textit{vimarśa}) aspect of perception and the Grammarian theory of language. Abhinava matches three stages of Bhartrihari's account of the fragmentation of the absolute word (\textit{parāvāk}) with the main levels (\textit{bhūvanas}) of the Trika cosmos. Examining these correlated points will indicate in what ways AKS may have been influenced by the Grammarians. Abhinava writes:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{253} Ibid. , 54.
\item \textsuperscript{254} Ibid. , 54. This seems to indicate that all perception, by virtue of the fact that it occurs within our experience, is direct. This sheds an interesting light on Mohanty's remarks about ontology and direct perception.
\item \textsuperscript{255} Ibid. , 54.
\item \textsuperscript{256} Ibid. , 54.
\end{itemize}
Recognition \([\text{pratyavamarśa}]\) has the nature of verbalization \([\text{śabdana}]\) as an inner talking \([\text{antarabhilāpa}]\). That verbalization does not at all depend upon the establishment of reference by convention \([\text{saṃketa}]\). ... It is the life of language sounds of the realm of Māyā, such as \([\text{the phoneme}] 'a',\) etc., which have their reference fixed through convention. It is called supreme because it is the inner foundation of recognitive judgments \([\text{pratyavamarśa}]\) such as 'This is blue' and 'I am Caitra,' and because it is perfect. It is called speech because it speaks the universe by means of recognitive judgment \([\text{pratyavamarśa}]\). For this reason, 'as its own essence,' i.e., in the form of consciousness, and as resting \([\text{viśrāntī}]\) in itself- it is the 'arisen,' i.e., always unset, eternal 'I'. ....

Then there is the supreme-Nonsupreme \([\text{parāpara}]\) in the condition of seeing \([\text{paśyanti}]\), at the level of Śrī Śadāśiva. Here there arises the recognitive judgment \([\text{pratyavamarśa}]\) having the form 'this,' which [because it begins to fragment the Self] involves ignorance. Nevertheless there is still the [proper understanding that the judgment 'this'] rests \([\text{viśrāntī}]\) on the condition of 'I.'

There is the lower state when there is rest on the condition of 'this.' This state belongs to Viṣṇu, Viśṇica, Indra, etc., who rule over the womb of māyā.\(^{257}\)

Abhinava has made these remarks in reference to the process of emanation. What follows from this is that in some way speech is responsible, or perhaps indicative, of the multiplicity of manifestation. In this passage it is said "that verbalization does not at all depend upon the establishment of reference by convention."\(^{258}\) I take reference by convention to be recognition that is the result of language. For this reason it seems likely that what Abhinava is referring to as verbalization may be mantric recitations; specifically recitations of phonemic mantras, a flavor AKS were quite fond of. The last two lines of the first paragraph reveal that speech, which is essentially identified with consciousness, is creative. There are two ways to take this claim: 1) in a strictly ontological sense; therefore speech actually is the substratum of the 'all,' or 2) in a weaker ontological sense, in which we can claim that language is responsible for how we fashion our worlds. This connects the Grammarian leanings of the AKS with the recognitive

\(^{257}\) Lawrence, Rediscovering, 94.

\(^{258}\) Ibid., 94.
(vimarśa) aspect of consciousness (caitanya) because language seems to play an active role as it builds new forms from the substrate of speech [words and sentences are formed from phonemes] much like recognizable perception (vimarśa) forms objects [by 'fashioning' perceiving] from the substrate of caitanya.\textsuperscript{259} I feel certain that language is functioning as the fashioner of perceptions into objects, which will then be 'entities' to reference with language. What we then end up with is a dialectic where language forms and permeates experience, even though in the strictest ontological sense there may be no distinction between entities.

Here we see that language does function as the womb (mārkā) that imprisons us in a world of dualistic experience.\textsuperscript{260} Furthermore, as I have already said, what is real is the manifest, so it seems that to talk about an experience of "ahamśiva,\textsuperscript{261} recognition that all things are manifest within, and of consciousness, may be problematic if we wish to resist positing some other realm of experience. As I see it, what may ultimately free one from the prison of differencing language is to realize the conventionality of language. Baumer remarks on this point:

\begin{quote}
\ldots Abhinavagupta is able, by analyzing grammatical structures, to throw light on reality \textit{in toto}, because, as he himself says language and the rules of grammar reflect consciousness. This is not limited to Sanskrit but applies to all languages, for 'there is no speech which does not reach the heart directly.'\textsuperscript{262}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{259} It may be helpful to refer to chapter 2 and the role of the \textit{Ahamkāra} as what colors our perceptions.
\textsuperscript{260} In conversation Brad Bassler commented about the "prison house of language" found in Gnosticism.
\textsuperscript{261} "ahamśiva": I am Śiva, or literally I/Śiva.
\textsuperscript{262} Baumer, \textit{Parātrīṣikā}, xvii.
To do this is to see the nature of phenomena empty of a self-nature, waiting to be fashioned by language. Freedom isn't achieved by transcendence; rather, it is achieved through close attention and penetration into the role of language in order to reveal the nature of manifestation at a different level. Dyczkowski remarks:

It is a fact clearly proved (siddha) by personal experience that speech is invariably associated with thought. It [speech] is the vehicle and essence of thought, while thought is the source of speech, they stand and fall together. Mental representation which orders the influx of sensations and presents us with a meaningful, balanced picture of the outer physical environment, memory, the elaboration of ideas and the shifting tide of emotions are all intimately connected with language. Language and the awareness which renders it meaningful serve as the essential connection between the inner world of consciousness and the outer world of material objects... To grasp the basis of language is to come in touch with the very cause of the world of our daily lives.

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263 This seems to be similar to the point of Buddhism as I understand it. Conventionally speaking, and even absolutely speaking phenomena are discrete occurrences [svalakṣaṇa]. But when it comes to the nature of these direct perceptions the verdict has to be empty.

264 I say this because there is usually a notion of moving beyond when we speak of Transcendence. In this system transcendence in this manner does not work, as there is no beyond. The notion of Transcendence is usually taken from parā or anuttara. Both terms carry a sense of the "highest," which may also function as a grounding. In this way, Transcendence is a movement into what was already there but with a new epistemological orientation. Transcendence does seem to work well if we understand it as a transcending of our epistemological orientation. This does seem to be supported as a goal: to transcend our ordinary orientation towards the world through a practice of penetration. Similarly, the transcendence nature of Bhairava is not so much ontological as it is epistemological. Bhairava maintains an epistemological orientation that constantly has access into the nature of phenomenal experiences as fashionable. For one to transcend would be to have access to both orientations and the ability to shift back and forth between them-to see the ultimate nature of the universe as composed of consciousness (caitanya), while perceiving it as differentiated. See Muller-Ortega, Heart, 90-97. For another reference to Transcendence as another term, see Dyczkowski, Aphorisms, 100. Immanence is the other side of transcendence. Now, as I have said, I don't think we should look at Bhairava's transcendence, and our possibility of transcendence, as indicative of a difference or transformation in ontology. Because this is the case, I believe that AKS offers an ontology of immanence. Transcendence only occurs with respect to how we perceive. We perceptually transcend by penetrating into our awareness and recognizing the immanence of consciousness (caitanya) at all points of existence.

265 Dyczkowski, Aphorisms, 20-21. Dyczkowski, 102, further remarks on language and the formation of objects: The Path of Denotation (Vācakādhvā), corresponding to the Path of time, is represented in its outer supreme, subtle and gross aspects by letters, Mantras and sentences, inwardly grounded in pure perception (pramā), the subject and the means of knowledge, respectively. The Path of denoted Meaning (vācyādhvā), corresponding to the Path of Space, consists of the five cosmic forces (kalā), thirty-six categories of existence and (tattva) and the 118 world systems (bhuvana). These constitute the sphere of objectivity ranging from supreme [anuttara] to gross [prthivī].
Siva Sūtra 3/25 illuminates the notion of penetration also. It says "the (diverse) perceptions of the individual elements of experience [tattva-s] are unified by penetrating into the (underlying) acting subjectivity (which generates and hence connects them all together)."266 Again, sūtra 3/4 says

The withdrawal of the forces there [in the body] is said to be the progressive penetration [and absorption, anupravea, of each of them] into their respective causes. This continues until [the yogī] attains a body of pure awakened consciousness (bodhabheda) and there [experiences] the Supreme Arising (parodaya, of ultimate reality).267

This progressive penetration is what I am referring to when I speak of "paying close attention."

One last remark must be stated about this passage. I am tempted to speak of the "illusion" of differences in manifestation and Abhinava has opened the door for me to do so by using the term māyā to denote the state in which 'this' (idam) is taken to be a distinct discrete object existing independently of the subject. However, I would argue that we should interpret any reference [māyā] to the illusory nature of this state in the sense Dyczkowski proposes.268

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266 Ibid., 137.
267 Ibid., 100.
268 Dyczkowski, Vibration, 46-47. He says: "According to Somānanda, only that which hypothetically exists outside consciousness can be said to be non-existent (avastu) and hence false. Daily life carried on without knowledge that everything is manifest within consciousness is illusory or unreal in that sense alone."
CHAPTER 4: PARTICIPATION THROUGH RITUAL

We also must look about us in this neighborhood, to see whether and in what manner it shows us something that transforms our relation to language. But of the way which is to lead us to the source of this possibility, it was said that it leads us only to where we already are. The “only” here does not mean a limitation, but rather points to this way’s pure simplicity. The way allows us to reach what concerns us, in that domain where we are already staying. Why then, one may ask, still find a way to it? Answer: because where we already are, we are in such a way that at the same time we are not there, because we ourselves have not yet properly reached what concerns our being, not even approached it.269

-Martin Heidegger

“To say,’… means to show: to make appear, set free, that is, to offer and extend what we call World, lighting and concealing it.”270

-Martin Heidegger

What we have been discussing so far is only a portion of the AKS system. It is generally recognized that the Āgamas "distribute their teachings into four 'quarters' (padas): jñāna- or vidyā-, kriyā-, carya-, and yoga- pāda (in any order), which respectively deal with doctrines, rituals, right conduct and praxis. The Jñānapāda, or

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270 Heidegger, *On the Way*, 93. For more on this see O. Bradley Bassler, "The Birthplace of Thinking: Heidegger's Late Thoughts on Tautology," *Heidegger Studies* 17 (2001). I believe there may be some connections between AKS Španda and Heidegger's Ālētheia, though I am in no position to argue this. See Lawrence, *Rediscovering*, 117-118.
Science of Śiva,\textsuperscript{271} which this work has been primarily concerned with, is only part of the AKS system. This chapter will primarily focus on the \textit{kriyā}, or ritual aspects of AKS. Included among this list of what we will be looking at are: mantric recitations, purification ceremonies, and \textit{mudric} postures. This list is not meant to be comprehensive, and it certainly raises some problematic points concerning categorization and inclusiveness. For instance, it is not uncommon to see practices that we might generally include as ritual categorized in the \textit{caryapāda}.\textsuperscript{272} Dīkṣā ritual is just such a practice. Given that there are a multitude of AKS sects that more or less prescribe to the same doctrine, \textit{jñānapāda}, we generally find certain practices accepted by some sects, and rejected by others. Indeed, even within a particular sect it is not uncommon to find disagreement over what actions constitute the \textit{kriyāpāda}. I have decided to focus on the \textit{kriyā} of the AKS, particularly the \textit{Kriyāpāda} of the PTV, one of the commentaries on the \textit{Parātrīśikā} by Abhinavagupta. My decision to focus specifically on the rituals expounded there is the result of what I sense to be a lack of scholarship concerning ritual in AKS. Additionally, the guidance and urging by Glenn Wallis, a Medieval Indian ritual specialist in his own right, to "pay attention" to ritual practices has further concretized my decision to examine ritual.

\textsuperscript{271} Hélène Brunner, "\textit{Jñāna} and \textit{Kriyā}: Relation Between Theory and Practice in the Śaivāgamas," in \textit{Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantra}, ed. Teun Goudriaan (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1992), 8. Brunner refers to the Philosophical doctrinal aspect of a system, its \textit{jñānapāda}, as the science \textit{pāda} (quarter). This would include ideas such as cosmology, epistemology, cosmogony etc.

**Why Is Philosophical, as Well as Ritual Study Important?**

Richard Davis, a Śaiva-siddhānta specialist, writes: "These [the propositional discourse of philosophical knowledge (jñāna) and the practical discourse of ritual action (Kriyā)], are, in the Śaiva view, integral and necessary to one another." This point cannot be stressed enough; it is necessary to attend to all quarters of Tantric systems in order to provide a full account. Historically among Western scholars, a majority of the work with AKS has been directed to the purely philosophical doctrinal aspects. I see nothing inherently wrong with this approach; however, I wish to take seriously the comments of Rāmakantha that Davis provides in his work. Rāmakantha relates:

A certain commentator who knew only philosophy completed an extensive examination of the knowledge section (jñānapada), and altogether disregarded the three practical sections concerning ritual action, Yoga, and proper conduct. Whereas I, honoring Lord Śiva, will here compose a lucid exposition of those sections as well, because the types of action prescribed here conform (anuga) completely with the meanings of philosophical discourse.

Davis goes on to tell how originally he had intended to do his work based solely on the ritual of the Śaiva-siddhānta, eventually realizing that this only presented a partial understanding. In the end he found it necessary, as I have, to "rethink ourselves the convictions and intentions a well-versed" practitioner would have. In effect, we must try to embody and enmind the states that a practitioner would have, or does. I would also like to say that I think it is important to take very seriously what these Śaiva masters, in our case Abhinavagupta, had to say about kriyā and its importance. We should guard against simply dismissing the importance of ritual because of our enlightenment attitudes, and we should equally guard against our twentieth century desire to explain things in

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273 For an enlightening discussion of ritual see Wallis, *Mediating the Power of Buddhas*.
275 Ibid., ix.
terms of sociology and anthropology. We also cannot simply dismiss the Jñānapada because of our own desire to be free from metaphysics; a feat we still fall short of.

Including a chapter on ritual seems out of place considering that the previous chapters have all more or less revolved around the philosophic doctrinal aspects of AKS (jñānapada). However, what I have tried to make apparent is the priority accorded to phenomenological observation, a result of the primacy of self-reflexive illumination (vimarśapratkāśa), perception (pratyakṣa), in justification and positing of philosophical claims. These positions constitute the identifying features of the AKS system, and likewise constitute the identifying understandings of AKS practitioners. The way that practitioners come to re-cognize these positions is through participation in certain activities. These activities are what have generally come to be known as rituals. Therefore, I believe examining the role of ritual in AKS may prove helpful not only to remind us that information is just one of the ingredients for liberation, but also to indicate how it is a practitioner actually re-cognizes these positions. First, we need to come to some resolve as to what we mean when we talk about ritual.

**What is Ritual?**

Ritual is usually taken to be a translation of the term Kriyā. The Kriyā practices involve a number of techniques. These may include mantra recitation, mudra gestures, puja, and various meditational forms. Commonly meditational practices are excluded from the Kriyāpāda, or the ritual quarter of Āgamas. I would include these practices as ritual forms, only because they are means (upāya). In fact it is my contention that the defining characteristic of ritual is that it is a means to an end. Now, this type of

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276 A result of the recognitive nature of consciousness (caitanya).
characterization certainly causes some problems. After all, as I have commonly heard said, every action, simply by virtue of the fact that it is an action, is ritual. I disagree. To define ritual in this manner results in diluting the significance of ritual to mundane tasks such as brushing our teeth. I am not saying that there are not ritual elements in such actions, only that they lack something which religious ritual does not: a transformative aspect that is meaningful to the practitioner. I believe that this idea of the transformative character of ritual is a necessary component. Otherwise we risk falling prey to simply equating religious action (Kriyā) with mundane action (karma).277

On a very basic level the Jñāna and Kriyāpāda-s seem to function as a cause and effect description: The jñānapada describes the effect, that is what one can expect from certain causes: causes that are caused by the practices described in the Kriyāpāda. Understanding what comes first, doctrine or practice, is a matter of debate. As Helene Brunner remarks on Kriyā and Jñāna pāda-s: "Let us for the moment only note that, here too, Kriyā is given prominence over jnana: the soul, it seems, must acquire the capacity to act before the "wish to know" arises in it." Abhinava gives a similar impression when he writes that what he has written, the Partriśikā, is a brief exposition for those who have already been practicing and are familiar with the śāstra.278 I personally believe that neither of these remarks should be, nor were they intended to be, taken as claims that jnana is always to be preceded by kriyā. It is perhaps in a manner much like the functions of the hermeneutic circle that these two pāda-s functioned. The practitioner began kriyā, already having some jñāna, and the jñāna becomes more illumined as the

277 In conversation with Glenn Wallis we discussed the notion of the “face of receptivity” of ritual practitioners. Perhaps in this idea we will find what it is that transforms an action (karma) into a ritual action (kriyā). See also Lusthaus, Yogacara, for a comparison of Buddhist notions of Karma and Kriyā.278 Brunner, Jñāna, 7.
279 Baumer, Parātriśikā, 5.
practice continues, which effects the results and actions of the kriyā, and so on until one becomes a knower of the field (kṣetrajñā). At any rate, it appears that kriyā is certainly an important aspect of the AKS, including the Trika system of Abhinava.

**Varieties of Ritual in AKS**

Dyczkowski discusses the four categories of Means (upāya) to realization: Anupāya, Śāmbhavopāya, Śāktopāya, and Ānavopāya. Evidently a master would not necessarily initiate a student's training with the most basic means (ānavopya), but instead the master would "first instruct in the highest means and then try lower ones if he fails to liberate his disciple." A brief gloss on these four means will be helpful. Anupāya is the practice, if we can even call it that, which all means ultimately lead to because it is practice "which conforms to ultimate reality." Abhinava writes:

> Not grounded in anything, this [light] is not energy, the great Goddess; nor is it god, the power-holder, because it is not the foundation of anything. It is not an object of meditation because there is none who meditates, nor is it he who meditates because there is nothing to meditate on. It is not an object to worship because there is none to worship it, nor is it the worshipper because there is nothing to worship. This all pervasive [reality] is not mantra, not that which is expressed by Mantra, nor he who utters it. This [reality], the Great God (maheśvara), is not initiation, the initiator or the initiated.

In a sense, this means is liberation itself. Śāmbhavopāya is considered the divine means. "The divine (Śāmbhava) form of mystical absorption is said to be that which is born of an intense awakening of consciousness [brought about by the master in the

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281 Ibid., 175.
282 Ibid., 177.
283 Ibid., 177.
disciple] free of all thought constructs [vikalpa]. This is the state of *ahamśiva*; that is, the practitioner is utterly aware of the fact that he is Śiva. One of the practices of this group is meditation on the center (*madhya*). This is a common practice revealed in the *Spandakārikās*. It involves the practitioner focusing on the "center (*Madhya*) between one cognition and the next, for it is there that he discovers the expansion (*unmeṣa*) of consciousness free of thought-constructs from whence all differentiated perceptions (*vikalpa*) emerge. Śāktopāya, the empowered means, are internal. In effect, they are the internalized practices of the individual means (*ānavopāya*). This would include internalized *mantra*, and *mudrā*-s. One practice in particular would be the sexual union *mudra* (*mahamudra*) that is commonly practiced externally between a *Yogin* and *Yogini*, but may also be practiced internally by one's self. These means "function within the mental sphere (*cetas*) by reconverting thought (*vikalpa*) back into pure consciousness which is its source and essence."

The last group of practices is the *Ānavopāya*, or individual means. These practices are said to be individual because they occur within the individual soul's (*anu*) sphere of consciousness. Any spiritual discipline which involves the recitation of *Mantra*'-s, posturing of the body, meditation on a particular divine or cosmic form and concentration on a fixed point, either within the body or outside it, belongs to this category. . . This means, like the empowered means, is concerned with the purification of thought (*vikalpasamkāra*), which in this case is achieved through the contemplative absorption that results from a meditative awareness sustained by objective supports.

I think we can mend the gap between these two types of ritual, those with means and those without, if we are willing to recognize that there are various types of ritual.

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284 Ibid., 172. While this idea of grace, sometimes attributed to Śiva, sometimes to the master, seems to imply a dualism, I think it is merely a heuristic, especially if we keep in mind that the one who graces, is no different than the one graced. Essentially, the practitioner graces himself.

285 Ibid., 182.

286 Ibid., 173.

287 Ibid., 173.
actions, all of which provide some type of effect, though the effects may differ drastically. AKS recognizes two potential results of ritual activity, though they will commonly deny that upāya devoid of external actions are actually kriyā, opting instead to use Kriyā as a designation of external ritual activity (pūjā, circumabulation, mudrā, etc.). The two are bhoga (worldly results: siddhic powers) and jīvanmukti (liberation within life). While some aspirants may be able to achieve jīvanmukti without participating in the outer, externalized ritual, more commonly it is necessary first to begin with external Kriyā, which condition the practitioneer so that they can progress to the other, less activity oriented practices, i.e. contemplative meditation. As I said earlier, I would include the contemplative practices within the realm of Kriyā simply because they are means, but this is not a point that seems to be well accepted among theorists.288

I earlier stated that Abhinava admits to the importance of Kriyā over jñāna, but he is also known to remark against the ultimate significance of kriyā by deferring importance to jñāna.289 However, the jñāna he is referring to is not simply knowledge as

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288 I would, however, draw important distinctions between external kriyā, and internal kriyā. It seems that external kriyā is still somewhat dependent upon vikalpa (thought constructs), while contemplative kriya seems to be less permeated with vikalpa. Indeed, between Śāmbhavopāya (a purely contemplative form of nirvikalpa meditation), and Ānavopāya (which is concerned with practices that directly involve thought constructs: mantras, mudrā-s, and pūjā) lies Śāktopāya (a form of practice that involves internal usage of the actions that are externally practiced during the Ānavopāya stage). What really seems to differentiate the two is that external practice seems to be focused on recognition of unity-diversity of phenomenal experience, and internal practice is perceiving in the manner revealed through the external practice. The difference may also be one of penetration with, and without effort, and have little if anything to do with thought constructs.

289 For some reason, I sense an incongruity between the above mentioned hierarchy of means, and remarks among AKS master on the validity of all means. Dyczkowski, Canon, 167, relates Abhinava’s view on this issue:

"In an important passage in the Tantraloka (4/221-270) Abhinava comments on part of chapter 18 of the MVT (18/74-81) which he presents as typifying the Trika view and which he contrasts with that of the Śaivasiddhānta, on the one hand, and Kula on the other. Thus, whereas the former enjoins the performance of rituals and the observance of vows and rules governing outer conduct, the Kula position is seen to be one of denying their validity and rejection of these outer forms in favor of inner spiritual discipline. Kula doctrine is essentially based, from this part of view, on an exclusivist monism (advaya) intolerant of contrasts, which thus rejects all forms of spiritual discipline that are 'external', that is, 'outside' in the state of duality. The Trika view, however,
we are likely to understand it; that is, as a collection of intellectual facts. Rather, possessing jñāna seems to entail a transformation on the part of the knower. One only "knows" when one has experienced. This is why Abhinava reminds us to "see for ourselves." Another interesting point to keep in mind is the linguistic element in Abhinava's system. For this reason, mantra and mudrā recitation tend to be viewed as aspects of jñāna, and not necessarily rituals (kriyā). Mantras are common means employed to help one to become a Khecarī (sky-mover, or wanderer in sky). Abhinava remarks on mantras as ritual: "Thus continuously remembering the seed-mantra (bīja-mantra), even in the midst of his daily affairs, then as a result of this practice of remembrance, the ritual of worship is duly performed." I agree with Ortega when he remarks that this passage is Abhinava's attempt to argue that the "various methods of ritual and worship can all be reduced to the proper remembrance of the mantra." As one of the possible attainments is bhoga, it makes sense that many rituals described will be intended to provide worldly enjoyments; siddhic powers and the "such". Interestingly enough, in the Tantraloka Abhinava relates a number of rituals and remarks that their [rituals] efficaciousness in respect to liberation resides solely in the fact that they "cause

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290 Muller-Ortega, Heart, 186.
291 Ibid., 187.
joy to the Heart. n292 Ortega remarks that causing joy to the heart is beneficial in the fact that it prepares "the mind and spirit for the practice of absorption and the attainment of concentration." n293 Personally, it makes the most sense to me to approach the majority of the kriyā outlined in Abhinava's work in this manner; as a preparatory practice that prepares the practitioner for more introspective and internal kriyā, which, as far as Abhinava seems to be concerned, involve the use of mantra.

**Manric Ritual in the Parātrīśikā-laghuvrttih**

I would now like to briefly discuss some elements from a short meditation manual written by Abhinava entitled Parātrīśikā. Within this text there are numerous ritual activities that Abhinava says the practitioner should participate in. There are mudric, mantric, and maṇḍalic practices, all of which can be done either internally or externally. There is even mention of pūjā, but the extent that the pūjā mentioned here is similar to that of the pūjā of most bhakti cults is questionable. For instance, after saying that “one must properly honor [the Goddess] with fragrant flowers which effortlessly allow entrance into the heart,” Abhinava remarks that “by flowers here are meant all substance-external and internal- which nourish the heart because they bestow their own nature within the heart.” n294 It is not that uncommon to find such a range of efficacious practices in AKS works, especially those of the Trika school. But what is particularly interesting about this text is the extensive role that Abhinava allows the Sanskrit alphabet to play as a schemata indicative of a cosmological theory and a means of liberation. n295

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292 Ibid., 194.
293 Ibid., 194-195.
294 Ibid., 227.
295 Bäumer, *Parātrīśikā*, xvi. Bäumer writes:
Undoubtedly, the extensive role of the alphabet is the result of the priority accorded to mantric recitation as a means of meditation, and it seems plausible that there is a priority of mantric recitation because the AKS from the earliest period, that of the writing of the Śiva Sūtras understood language as the matrix, or womb [mārkā] that functioned as an imprisoner and a liberator. In this manual mantra is used during almost every step of ritual participation, usually as a means of purifying and perfecting. Abhinava writes: “Whatsoever is declared to be perfected in other treatises, all that is perfected by this mantra. What is to be perfected is only the attainment of that mantra.”

This ritual practice, the use of mantra, is designed to make apparent the linguistically perceived nature of phenomenal experience. Mantra does this by revealing how language functions. It is my understanding that language functions as a descriptive model of cosmological manifestation because the nature of perception is inherently linguistic. What follows from this is that perception (pratyakṣa) is interpretive: manifestation, or illumination functions as an interpretation of consciousness qua phenomenal experience. The recognitive awareness of the nature of language as intrepetively (perceptually) fashioning then becomes coupled with the cosmological manifestation schemata based in the Sanskrit alphabet. Then one has the ingredients

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A great part of the reflection on the meaning of letters is centered around the two ways of arranging the letters of the Sanskrit alphabet, Mārkā and Mālinī. In the words of Jaideva Singh: ‘Trikā philosophy maintains that the entire manifestation is an expression of parā sakti or parā vāk or transcendental logos. This parā vāk is creative energy. Every letter of the alphabet represents energy in some form. The letters of the alphabet are arranged in two schemes in Trika, viz. Mārkā and Mālinī. Mārkā means the little mother or phonematic creative energy. Mālinī literally means the Devī who wears a mālā or garland of fifty letters of the Sanskrit alphabet…..The main difference between Mārkā and Mālinī consists in the arrangement of letters. In Mārkā, they are arranged in a regular order, i.e. the vowels come first and the consonants come next in a serial order. In Mālinī, they are arranged in an irregular way, i.e. the vowels and consonants are mixed and no serial order is observed.’

I have noticed that Abhinava generally uses the Mārkā order in the works I have observed.

Muller-Ortega, Heart, 218.

Again, refer to my remarks on the questionability of the status of objects of experience.
necessary to compare the workings of perception with those of language in order to see
that they are both intimately connected, and both are responsible for the fashioning of the
phenomenal world.

As I have stated earlier, I believe that what AKS is really advocating is not a
transcendence of phenomenal experience into some other realm; rather, they are
decreeing the importance of penetration into the nature of phenomenal experience.²⁹⁸

Abhinava corroborates this:

When this seed is pronounced, that is, as soon as it is absorbed into the
level of the vital breath, immediately the mantra-s and mudrā-s, whose
bodies are the powers of knowledge and action respectively, appear
before the one who pronounces the seed [seed mantra].

How? By penetrating into his body. Indeed, his own body is
penetrated by that vital breath [self-reflexive consciousness (caitanya);
perception (pratyakṣa)] which is merged in the form of the heart, whose
characteristic is a completely full knowledge and action. Even the body
which is filled by the heart is penetrated by the mantra-s and mudrā-s
whose nature is respectively, knowledge and action. Therefore, the basic
principle of these supernatural powers is that they are governed by the
mantra-s and mudra-s.²⁹⁹

Mantra and mudrā are said to be the bodies of the powers of knowledge and action,
meaning that mantra and mudrā are the bodies of perception, as is the vital breath. We
use these powers to penetrate into our body. Here body carries the double meaning of the
gross physical body, as well as the body of the cosmos, consciousness (caitanya). So,
what this passage reveals is that we use perception to penetrate into phenomenal
experience, which is constitutive of perception [consciousness].³⁰⁰

²⁹⁸ For instance, Meditation on the middle (madhya) may be one such practice used for this.
²⁹⁹ Muller-Ortega, Heart, 216.
³⁰⁰ In response to remarks by Brad Bassler about "constitutive of" as used here, I would equally endorse
"constituted by" as both seem to be the case as far as I understand AKS.
Abhinava spends a considerable portion of this manual explaining how the Sanskrit alphabet is representative, and constitutive of manifestation.\textsuperscript{301} He relates the specific \textit{tattva} each phoneme corresponds to. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this linguistic schemata of the universe is the phoneme 'a'. The ‘a,’ representing the Ultimate (\textit{Anuttara: Bhairava}) stands alone. It can stand alone and does not require another to activate it.\textsuperscript{302} It can stand alone because it has the ability to activate itself, much like consciousness (\textit{caitanya}) has the bi-nature of self-reflexive illumination. The ‘a’ is static and passive. It is a necessary component of the entire alphabet. In a sense the ‘a’ activates the other letters. It is even present as the activating factor of the vowels of the Sanskrit alphabet. It is a necessary component of all the syllables. Without it they are impotent. One can recognize the immanence of the ‘a’ through close attention (penetration) to speech. \textit{Mantra-s} are intended to reveal this fact of speech- the immanence of the ‘a’. In this way one recognizes that all speech is fashioned from the ‘a’. Realizing the way that the ‘a’ becomes fashioned in language, and realizing the role of language in perception, allows the practitioner to penetrate phenomenal experience in a manner similar to the penetration of phenomenal everyday speech. These penetrations allow experience of the grounding substratum of phenomenal experience and speech as consciousness (\textit{caitanya}) and the phoneme ‘a,’ respectively.\textsuperscript{303}

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\textsuperscript{301} Ibid. , 208.  \\
\textsuperscript{302} Perception does not require another to perceive it: self-illuminating (\textit{svapvakāśa}).  \\
\textsuperscript{303} Much of the information here, about the alphabet and the ‘a,’ are my own thoughts. As far as I know little, if any work, has been done on this theory.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Reflections on Ritual and Theory (*Jñāna* and *Kriyā*),

*(Participation and Identity)*

I would like to make a few remarks about the idea of ritual practice. Firstly, the overarching theme of Abhinava’s work that deals with ritual seems to focus on *Mantric* recitation, either internal or external. This is an important fact because it is certain that the functions of speech were of utmost importance to AKS. As we saw in Chapter Three, there are intimate connections between cosmology, epistemology, metaphysics, and speech theory, specifically those of the Grammarians. My sense is that the notion of the reality of appearance, which is incompatible with a theory of transcendence into liberation, leaves very few possible alternatives other than penetration into the ultimate nature of phenomena through close attention to, or penetration into, the functions of language. This idea is consistent with the view of language as the womb (*mātrakā*) that imprisons, as well as liberates.

My reasons for studying AKS are the result of an obsessive fascination with the notion of non-duality (*advaya*). Loy’s book *Nonduality* proves enlightening, but I feel that one point is a little sticky: transcendence as a means of realization of non-duality (*advaya*). The shift in epistemological orientation that reveals non-duality, which I have been referring to, is not really a transcendence of phenomena; rather it seems to be more of a penetration into the nature of phenomena. In this sense there is never really a drive

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304 Possibly ontological similarities.

305 Our only delusion, which in some ways imprisons us, is to not have recognized yet. The only reason for not having recognized yet is because we haven’t paid close attention to things as they appear/are.
to escape thought constructions (vikalpa); instead, the idea seems to be to relax proliferation of these constructs (vikalpa) through the four means in order to penetrate effortlessly into the nature of perceptual experience.\footnote{What is revealed so far as the ontological status of the phenomea is not yet apparent to me}

The idea that rituals may be performed that make use of thought construct (vikalpa) practices in order to prepare the practitioner for later stages seems consistent with many of the AKS practices. Dyczkowski writes: "This means (āavopāya), like the empowered means (Śāktopāya) is concerned with the purification of thought (vikalpasāmkāra), which in this case is achieved through the contemplative absorption that results from a meditative awareness sustained by objective supports."\footnote{Dyczkowski, Vibration, 173.} I think we should be wary of taking this passage to its possible extreme (the notion of total escape of thought constructivity) because it seems that we cannot escape languaged experience. We cannot escape this type of experience because it is the inherent nature of consciousness (caitanya) to cognize through recognition (vimarśa). After all, this is the goal: recognition of the nature of manifestation.

This brings us back to the section on perception and the use of certain techniques to allow one to perceive nondually. Dyczkowski remarks that what needs to be dealt with in order that we may perceive nondually are the vikalpa that constantly flood our mental space (the world). He remarks that this ability to cease our input into, and the effects of, these thought constructs (vikalpa) is what leads to nirvikalpa perception.\footnote{Here, nirvikalpa perception understood to be non-dual perception.} It is with Nirvikalpa perception that we are allowed a bare apprehension of reality, which for AKS is a direct insight into, and through, Bhairava. The way we can escape the influences of vikalpa is through the various Kriyā-ś, beginning with the external kriyā which are
intended to focus the mind (thought constructs) by eliminating the breadth of range these thought constructs inhabit. This direction of thought to a single point, joined with other practices intended to disturb our innate tendency to create and proliferate thought constructs comes to a point where our attention is so focused that it explodes, dissolving inner and outer, so that what follows is an ability to function "as" perception because the points of duality have collapsed. I disagree with Dyczkowski on this point. I remain unconvinced that AKS is claiming that *savikalpa* perception (*pratyakṣa*) can be overcome totally.

These remarks are quite interesting considering my claims that we can never escape perception that is conceptually constructed. As we become more focused we never lose sight of phenomenal perception; even as the dissolution of inner and outer occurs we are still perceiving phenomenal existence in a certain fashioned manner. What is different at this point is our epistemological orientation towards phenomena. We see it as it is- just as it is. What is revealed is nothing more than was, and is, revealed in any perceptual act- things as they are. But this tells us something about us, and our world.\(^{309}\) We are of the same nature, occurring in one field of awareness, composed of the same “stuff.” We are only Powers; Powers that are aware and active; that never cease to exist because they never began; that have indeterminate\(^{310}\) possibilities; that are full and empty; that are capable of creativity and dissolution. We know because we recognize that which we already knew- We are only *Bhairava*.

\(^{309}\) Again, my sense is that Abhinava is saying that the phenomenal object is ontological object, though I am not yet prepared to argue this point.

\(^{310}\) Parafinite? What I mean is that there is a limit to our possibilities but we have an incredibly large degree of possibility.
Final Thoughts

I think the big question that remains to be answered is, "In what sense, or senses, are we to understand "object" in AKS. As I stated earlier, there are at least two ways in which "object" can be understood. They are: 1) object as phenomenological object, and 2) object as phenomenological object as ontological object. I believe it is quite obvious that, at the least, we can understand "object" in the sense of phenomenal object. This seems well supported. But, I do not think it has been conclusively shown whether or not this is the only sense in which AKS means object when they speak about object. This will be my direction in the future- attempting to decipher the status, or statuses, of the "object."

As I said earlier, it is my sense that the phenomenal object is the ontological object. If this is the case, I believe what we have in the work of many of the AKS masters, and certainly in the case of Abhinava, is an example of phenomenological ontology. Mohanty discusses this position. He reveals that he was first taught this in Gottingen by a man named Hartmann. He also remarks about current work being done in this field by David Smith. He writes:

Smith ascribes to Husserl a sort of neutral monism: the same concrete particular, an experience, or an Ego, falls both under the region of "consciousness" and under the region of "nature," and so exemplifies two essences. This double-aspect ontology is developed in the essay in the present volume into a three phase ontology in which every thing has three phases: a form, an appearance, and a substrate. The last phase belongs to natural science, the first to theory of intentionality, and the second to the cultural sciences. Thus, the resulting ontology synthesizes transcendental phenomenology as theory of intentionality with the natural and cultural sciences. Many details still need to be worked out. For example, where does the distinction between fact and essence fit in? Where do "meanings" or noemata belong? or, values? Nevertheless, Smith, to my knowledge formulates the best available phenomenological ontology, and

Now, I am certainly not familiar with all these areas, but I have a sense that this notion of phenomenological ontology may just be what AKS is doing. At any rate, it is what I am interested in doing, and seeing how AKS stacks up against this type of approach.
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APPENDICES
Etymological Collection

Identity

Identity: 1. a: sameness of essential or generic character ion different instances. b: the distinguishing character or personality of an individual

- from LL identitat-, identitas, probably from L identidem repeatedly.

Identical: 1. a: being the same; selfsame b: having the same cause or origin 2. a: having such close resemblance as to be essentially the same
- from LL identitas

Identification: 1. a: the act of identifying; state of being identified 2. evidence of identity

Identify: 1. a: to cause to be or become identical b: to conceiver as united (as in spirit, outlook or principle) 3: to be or become the same

Participation

Participate: 1. to possess some of the attributes of a person, thing or quality. 2. a: to take part b: to have a share in
- from L part-, pars (part) and capere (to take)from

Participation: 1. a: the action or fact of participating b: the partaking of the substance, quality or nature of some thing or person 2. a: the fact or condition of sharing in common b: a taking part, association or sharing (with others) in some action or matter; spec. the active involvement of members of a community or organization in decisions which affect their lives and work c: participation mystique, imaginative identification with people and objects outside oneself, regarded as an attribute of primitive peoples by the french anthropologist Lucien Levy-Bruhl; merging of the individual consciousness with that of a group or with the external world.
- from L participation- em, n. of action from participare to participate

Practice: vb. 1. a: carry out; apply b: to do or perform often, habitually 2. a: to perform or work at repeatedly so as to become proficient b:
- from ME practisen, fr. MF practiser, fr. pratique (practice)

Practice: n. 1. a: actual performance or application b: a repeated or customary action 2. a: systematic exercise for proficiency
- from LL practice, fr. GK praktike, fr. fem. of praktikos,
Spanda and the de-Theizing [de-Personalizing] of Bhairava's Theistic Nature

Discussing the process of perception is similar to discussing the process of the emission and absorption of the universe. The same process is occurring, though in a localized and individual space. Again, this is to be expected as the tantric maxim claims: that not in the body, not in the universe. Recall that unmeṣa begins because there is something like a desire for paramaśiva to know its self, in some way different than it does; in a manner less than full. Equally and on a microcosmic scale, each act of perception is a reenactment of this process. It is a spewing forth of our consciousness in an attempt to contract it into an object that is fashioned according to the limiting factors of the ānujñāna. The limiting factors at this level are the thought functions of the manas and the ahaṃkāra. With the use of these tools we fashion the emitted consciousness (cit) into a particular form; and then when this form has been completed (fully perceived) we withdraw our consciousness, much as the universe is absorbed. All of this happens within the field of awareness in a manner totally consistent with the spanda process of manifestation. We emit our unified consciousness into a state of diverse objects which we then dissolve, and absorb this objective multiplicity as the act of perception is withdrawn.